From 00a2881c809fbf6cbefedb5df303417130b10b82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 12:54:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] --- yaml --- r: 156842 b: refs/heads/master c:
 8cf948e744e0218af604c32edecde10006dc8e9e h: refs/heads/master v: v3

---
 [refs]                         |  2 +-
 trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/[refs] b/[refs]
index 566f26229b5d..75a4970f66d5 100644
--- a/[refs]
+++ b/[refs]
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-refs/heads/master: 9c0d90103c7e0eb6e638e5b649e9f6d8d9c1b4b3
+refs/heads/master: 8cf948e744e0218af604c32edecde10006dc8e9e
diff --git a/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c b/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1e8cfc4c2ed6..e6d1432b0800 100644
--- a/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3030,9 +3030,21 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
-	if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+	/*
+	 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
+	 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check.  This is such a likely attempt
+	 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
+	 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
+	 */
+	if (addr < mmap_min_addr) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
 				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
 	if (rc || addr_only)
 		return rc;