From 68edc861e29789501feec43035ddfcb28f497fea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 12:54:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] --- yaml --- r: 157320 b: refs/heads/master c:
 84336d1a77ccd2c06a730ddd38e695c2324a7386 h: refs/heads/master v: v3

---
 [refs]                         |  2 +-
 trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/[refs] b/[refs]
index 89ea3f6f8422..5cc440f09597 100644
--- a/[refs]
+++ b/[refs]
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-refs/heads/master: 7c73875e7dda627040b12c19b01db634fa7f0fd1
+refs/heads/master: 84336d1a77ccd2c06a730ddd38e695c2324a7386
diff --git a/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c b/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e65677da36bd..8a78f584f46e 100644
--- a/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/trunk/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3034,9 +3034,21 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
-	if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+	/*
+	 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
+	 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check.  This is such a likely attempt
+	 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
+	 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
+	 */
+	if (addr < mmap_min_addr) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
 				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
 	if (rc || addr_only)
 		return rc;