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After something on the order of 8 years, Linux can now draw a bright line between “ring 0” (kernel memory) and “uid 0” (highest privilege level in userspace). The “kernel lockdown” feature, which has been an out-of-tree patch series in most Linux distros for almost as many years, attempts to enumerate all the intentional ways (i.e. interfaces not flaws) userspace might be able to read or modify kernel memory (or execute in kernel space), and disable them. While Matthew Garrett made the internal details fine-grained controllable, the basic lockdown LSM can be set to either disabled, “integrity” (kernel memory can be read but not written), or “confidentiality” (no kernel memory reads or writes). Beyond closing the many holes between userspace and the kernel, if new interfaces are added to the kernel that might violate kernel integrity or confidentiality, now there is a place to put the access control to make everyone happy and there doesn’t need to be a rehashing of the age old fight between “but root has full kernel access” vs “not in some system configurations”.
I propose to enable this, and set it to integrity.
config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY
bool "Integrity"
help
The kernel runs in integrity mode by default. Features that allow
the kernel to be modified at runtime are disabled.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Kees writes in security things in Linux v5.4:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=000d388ed3bbed745f366ce71b2bb7c2ee70f449
I propose to enable this, and set it to
integrity
.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: