diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index e4e1b65501156..4640d2553b477 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
 	select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
+	select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
index ed65576ce710b..6cc97730790e7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_ftrace.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_insn.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_return_address.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 
+# Remove stack protector to avoid triggering unneeded stack canary
+# checks due to randomize_kstack_offset.
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_syscall.o	 = -fstack-protector -fstack-protector-strong
+CFLAGS_syscall.o	+= -fno-stack-protector
+
 # Object file lists.
 obj-y			:= debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o		\
 			   entry-common.o entry-fpsimd.o process.o ptrace.o	\
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
index b9cf12b271d79..263d6c1a525f3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <asm/daifflags.h>
@@ -43,6 +44,8 @@ static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
 {
 	long ret;
 
+	add_random_kstack_offset();
+
 	if (scno < sc_nr) {
 		syscall_fn_t syscall_fn;
 		syscall_fn = syscall_table[array_index_nospec(scno, sc_nr)];
@@ -55,6 +58,19 @@ static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
 		ret = lower_32_bits(ret);
 
 	regs->regs[0] = ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
+	 * but not enough for arm64 stack utilization comfort. To keep
+	 * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 9 bits.
+	 *
+	 * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
+	 * applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
+	 * 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned SP at function boundaries.
+	 *
+	 * The resulting 5 bits of entropy is seen in SP[8:4].
+	 */
+	choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_int() & 0x1FF);
 }
 
 static inline bool has_syscall_work(unsigned long flags)