From c8644cd0efe719608ddcb341bcf087d4bc0bf6b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Maguire Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 15:25:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] bpf: refine kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled behaviour With unprivileged BPF disabled, all cmds associated with the BPF syscall are blocked to users without CAP_BPF/CAP_SYS_ADMIN. However there are use cases where we may wish to allow interactions with BPF programs without being able to load and attach them. So for example, a process with required capabilities loads/attaches a BPF program, and a process with less capabilities interacts with it; retrieving perf/ring buffer events, modifying map-specified config etc. With all BPF syscall commands blocked as a result of unprivileged BPF being disabled, this mode of interaction becomes impossible for processes without CAP_BPF. As Alexei notes "The bpf ACL model is the same as traditional file's ACL. The creds and ACLs are checked at open(). Then during file's write/read additional checks might be performed. BPF has such functionality already. Different map_creates have capability checks while map_lookup has: map_get_sys_perms(map, f) & FMODE_CAN_READ. In other words it's enough to gate FD-receiving parts of bpf with unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl. The rest is handled by availability of FD and access to files in bpffs." So key fd creation syscall commands BPF_PROG_LOAD and BPF_MAP_CREATE are blocked with unprivileged BPF disabled and no CAP_BPF. And as Alexei notes, map creation with unprivileged BPF disabled off blocks creation of maps aside from array, hash and ringbuf maps. Programs responsible for loading and attaching the BPF program can still control access to its pinned representation by restricting permissions on the pin path, as with normal files. Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire Acked-by: Yonghong Song Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu Acked-by: KP Singh Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652970334-30510-2-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 72e53489165d3..2b69306d3c6e6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -4863,9 +4863,21 @@ static int bpf_prog_bind_map(union bpf_attr *attr) static int __sys_bpf(int cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size) { union bpf_attr attr; + bool capable; int err; - if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable()) + capable = bpf_capable() || !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; + + /* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object + * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend + * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on + * object creation success. Capabilities are later verified for + * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged + * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these + * and other operations. + */ + if (!capable && + (cmd == BPF_MAP_CREATE || cmd == BPF_PROG_LOAD)) return -EPERM; err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(uattr, sizeof(attr), size); From 90a039fd19fc35d03a74ce2973992c878546cb20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Maguire Date: Thu, 19 May 2022 15:25:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] selftests/bpf: add tests verifying unprivileged bpf behaviour tests load/attach bpf prog with maps, perfbuf and ringbuf, pinning them. Then effective caps are dropped and we verify we can - pick up the pin - create ringbuf/perfbuf - get ringbuf/perfbuf events, carry out map update, lookup and delete - create a link Negative testing also ensures - BPF prog load fails - BPF map create fails - get fd by id fails - get next id fails - query fails - BTF load fails Signed-off-by: Alan Maguire Acked-by: Yonghong Song Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1652970334-30510-3-git-send-email-alan.maguire@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- .../bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c | 312 ++++++++++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/test_unpriv_bpf_disabled.c | 83 +++++ 2 files changed, 395 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_unpriv_bpf_disabled.c diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..2800185179cf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c @@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2022, Oracle and/or its affiliates. */ + +#include +#include + +#include "test_unpriv_bpf_disabled.skel.h" + +#include "cap_helpers.h" + +/* Using CAP_LAST_CAP is risky here, since it can get pulled in from + * an old /usr/include/linux/capability.h and be < CAP_BPF; as a result + * CAP_BPF would not be included in ALL_CAPS. Instead use CAP_BPF as + * we know its value is correct since it is explicitly defined in + * cap_helpers.h. + */ +#define ALL_CAPS ((2ULL << CAP_BPF) - 1) + +#define PINPATH "/sys/fs/bpf/unpriv_bpf_disabled_" +#define NUM_MAPS 7 + +static __u32 got_perfbuf_val; +static __u32 got_ringbuf_val; + +static int process_ringbuf(void *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +{ + if (ASSERT_EQ(len, sizeof(__u32), "ringbuf_size_valid")) + got_ringbuf_val = *(__u32 *)data; + return 0; +} + +static void process_perfbuf(void *ctx, int cpu, void *data, __u32 len) +{ + if (ASSERT_EQ(len, sizeof(__u32), "perfbuf_size_valid")) + got_perfbuf_val = *(__u32 *)data; +} + +static int sysctl_set(const char *sysctl_path, char *old_val, const char *new_val) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *fp; + + fp = fopen(sysctl_path, "r+"); + if (!fp) + return -errno; + if (old_val && fscanf(fp, "%s", old_val) <= 0) { + ret = -ENOENT; + } else if (!old_val || strcmp(old_val, new_val) != 0) { + fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET); + if (fprintf(fp, "%s", new_val) < 0) + ret = -errno; + } + fclose(fp); + + return ret; +} + +static void test_unpriv_bpf_disabled_positive(struct test_unpriv_bpf_disabled *skel, + __u32 prog_id, int prog_fd, int perf_fd, + char **map_paths, int *map_fds) +{ + struct perf_buffer *perfbuf = NULL; + struct ring_buffer *ringbuf = NULL; + int i, nr_cpus, link_fd = -1; + + nr_cpus = bpf_num_possible_cpus(); + + skel->bss->perfbuf_val = 1; + skel->bss->ringbuf_val = 2; + + /* Positive tests for unprivileged BPF disabled. Verify we can + * - retrieve and interact with pinned maps; + * - set up and interact with perf buffer; + * - set up and interact with ring buffer; + * - create a link + */ + perfbuf = perf_buffer__new(bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.perfbuf), 8, process_perfbuf, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(perfbuf, "perf_buffer__new")) + goto cleanup; + + ringbuf = ring_buffer__new(bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.ringbuf), process_ringbuf, NULL, NULL); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(ringbuf, "ring_buffer__new")) + goto cleanup; + + /* trigger & validate perf event, ringbuf output */ + usleep(1); + + ASSERT_GT(perf_buffer__poll(perfbuf, 100), -1, "perf_buffer__poll"); + ASSERT_EQ(got_perfbuf_val, skel->bss->perfbuf_val, "check_perfbuf_val"); + ASSERT_EQ(ring_buffer__consume(ringbuf), 1, "ring_buffer__consume"); + ASSERT_EQ(got_ringbuf_val, skel->bss->ringbuf_val, "check_ringbuf_val"); + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_MAPS; i++) { + map_fds[i] = bpf_obj_get(map_paths[i]); + if (!ASSERT_GT(map_fds[i], -1, "obj_get")) + goto cleanup; + } + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_MAPS; i++) { + bool prog_array = strstr(map_paths[i], "prog_array") != NULL; + bool array = strstr(map_paths[i], "array") != NULL; + bool buf = strstr(map_paths[i], "buf") != NULL; + __u32 key = 0, vals[nr_cpus], lookup_vals[nr_cpus]; + __u32 expected_val = 1; + int j; + + /* skip ringbuf, perfbuf */ + if (buf) + continue; + + for (j = 0; j < nr_cpus; j++) + vals[j] = expected_val; + + if (prog_array) { + /* need valid prog array value */ + vals[0] = prog_fd; + /* prog array lookup returns prog id, not fd */ + expected_val = prog_id; + } + ASSERT_OK(bpf_map_update_elem(map_fds[i], &key, vals, 0), "map_update_elem"); + ASSERT_OK(bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_fds[i], &key, &lookup_vals), "map_lookup_elem"); + ASSERT_EQ(lookup_vals[0], expected_val, "map_lookup_elem_values"); + if (!array) + ASSERT_OK(bpf_map_delete_elem(map_fds[i], &key), "map_delete_elem"); + } + + link_fd = bpf_link_create(bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.handle_perf_event), perf_fd, + BPF_PERF_EVENT, NULL); + ASSERT_GT(link_fd, 0, "link_create"); + +cleanup: + if (link_fd) + close(link_fd); + if (perfbuf) + perf_buffer__free(perfbuf); + if (ringbuf) + ring_buffer__free(ringbuf); +} + +static void test_unpriv_bpf_disabled_negative(struct test_unpriv_bpf_disabled *skel, + __u32 prog_id, int prog_fd, int perf_fd, + char **map_paths, int *map_fds) +{ + const struct bpf_insn prog_insns[] = { + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }; + const size_t prog_insn_cnt = sizeof(prog_insns) / sizeof(struct bpf_insn); + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_prog_load_opts, load_opts); + struct bpf_map_info map_info = {}; + __u32 map_info_len = sizeof(map_info); + struct bpf_link_info link_info = {}; + __u32 link_info_len = sizeof(link_info); + struct btf *btf = NULL; + __u32 attach_flags = 0; + __u32 prog_ids[3] = {}; + __u32 prog_cnt = 3; + __u32 next; + int i; + + /* Negative tests for unprivileged BPF disabled. Verify we cannot + * - load BPF programs; + * - create BPF maps; + * - get a prog/map/link fd by id; + * - get next prog/map/link id + * - query prog + * - BTF load + */ + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_prog_load(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER, "simple_prog", "GPL", + prog_insns, prog_insn_cnt, &load_opts), + -EPERM, "prog_load_fails"); + + for (i = BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH; i <= BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER; i++) + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_map_create(i, NULL, sizeof(int), sizeof(int), 1, NULL), + -EPERM, "map_create_fails"); + + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id(prog_id), -EPERM, "prog_get_fd_by_id_fails"); + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_prog_get_next_id(prog_id, &next), -EPERM, "prog_get_next_id_fails"); + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_prog_get_next_id(0, &next), -EPERM, "prog_get_next_id_fails"); + + if (ASSERT_OK(bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(map_fds[0], &map_info, &map_info_len), + "obj_get_info_by_fd")) { + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_map_get_fd_by_id(map_info.id), -EPERM, "map_get_fd_by_id_fails"); + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_map_get_next_id(map_info.id, &next), -EPERM, + "map_get_next_id_fails"); + } + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_map_get_next_id(0, &next), -EPERM, "map_get_next_id_fails"); + + if (ASSERT_OK(bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(bpf_link__fd(skel->links.sys_nanosleep_enter), + &link_info, &link_info_len), + "obj_get_info_by_fd")) { + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_link_get_fd_by_id(link_info.id), -EPERM, "link_get_fd_by_id_fails"); + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_link_get_next_id(link_info.id, &next), -EPERM, + "link_get_next_id_fails"); + } + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_link_get_next_id(0, &next), -EPERM, "link_get_next_id_fails"); + + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_prog_query(prog_fd, BPF_TRACE_FENTRY, 0, &attach_flags, prog_ids, + &prog_cnt), -EPERM, "prog_query_fails"); + + btf = btf__new_empty(); + if (ASSERT_OK_PTR(btf, "empty_btf") && + ASSERT_GT(btf__add_int(btf, "int", 4, 0), 0, "unpriv_int_type")) { + const void *raw_btf_data; + __u32 raw_btf_size; + + raw_btf_data = btf__raw_data(btf, &raw_btf_size); + if (ASSERT_OK_PTR(raw_btf_data, "raw_btf_data_good")) + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_btf_load(raw_btf_data, raw_btf_size, NULL), -EPERM, + "bpf_btf_load_fails"); + } + btf__free(btf); +} + +void test_unpriv_bpf_disabled(void) +{ + char *map_paths[NUM_MAPS] = { PINPATH "array", + PINPATH "percpu_array", + PINPATH "hash", + PINPATH "percpu_hash", + PINPATH "perfbuf", + PINPATH "ringbuf", + PINPATH "prog_array" }; + int map_fds[NUM_MAPS]; + struct test_unpriv_bpf_disabled *skel; + char unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig[32] = {}; + char perf_event_paranoid_orig[32] = {}; + struct bpf_prog_info prog_info = {}; + __u32 prog_info_len = sizeof(prog_info); + struct perf_event_attr attr = {}; + int prog_fd, perf_fd = -1, i, ret; + __u64 save_caps = 0; + __u32 prog_id; + + skel = test_unpriv_bpf_disabled__open_and_load(); + if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open")) + return; + + skel->bss->test_pid = getpid(); + + map_fds[0] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.array); + map_fds[1] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.percpu_array); + map_fds[2] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.hash); + map_fds[3] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.percpu_hash); + map_fds[4] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.perfbuf); + map_fds[5] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.ringbuf); + map_fds[6] = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.prog_array); + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_MAPS; i++) + ASSERT_OK(bpf_obj_pin(map_fds[i], map_paths[i]), "pin map_fd"); + + /* allow user without caps to use perf events */ + if (!ASSERT_OK(sysctl_set("/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid", perf_event_paranoid_orig, + "-1"), + "set_perf_event_paranoid")) + goto cleanup; + /* ensure unprivileged bpf disabled is set */ + ret = sysctl_set("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled", + unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig, "2"); + if (ret == -EPERM) { + /* if unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1, we get -EPERM back; that's okay. */ + if (!ASSERT_OK(strcmp(unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig, "1"), + "unpriviliged_bpf_disabled_on")) + goto cleanup; + } else { + if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "set unpriviliged_bpf_disabled")) + goto cleanup; + } + + prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.sys_nanosleep_enter); + ASSERT_OK(bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(prog_fd, &prog_info, &prog_info_len), + "obj_get_info_by_fd"); + prog_id = prog_info.id; + ASSERT_GT(prog_id, 0, "valid_prog_id"); + + attr.size = sizeof(attr); + attr.type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE; + attr.config = PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK; + attr.freq = 1; + attr.sample_freq = 1000; + perf_fd = syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &attr, -1, 0, -1, PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC); + if (!ASSERT_GE(perf_fd, 0, "perf_fd")) + goto cleanup; + + if (!ASSERT_OK(test_unpriv_bpf_disabled__attach(skel), "skel_attach")) + goto cleanup; + + if (!ASSERT_OK(cap_disable_effective(ALL_CAPS, &save_caps), "disable caps")) + goto cleanup; + + if (test__start_subtest("unpriv_bpf_disabled_positive")) + test_unpriv_bpf_disabled_positive(skel, prog_id, prog_fd, perf_fd, map_paths, + map_fds); + + if (test__start_subtest("unpriv_bpf_disabled_negative")) + test_unpriv_bpf_disabled_negative(skel, prog_id, prog_fd, perf_fd, map_paths, + map_fds); + +cleanup: + close(perf_fd); + if (save_caps) + cap_enable_effective(save_caps, NULL); + if (strlen(perf_event_paranoid_orig) > 0) + sysctl_set("/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid", NULL, perf_event_paranoid_orig); + if (strlen(unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig) > 0) + sysctl_set("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled", NULL, + unprivileged_bpf_disabled_orig); + for (i = 0; i < NUM_MAPS; i++) + unlink(map_paths[i]); + test_unpriv_bpf_disabled__destroy(skel); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_unpriv_bpf_disabled.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_unpriv_bpf_disabled.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..fc423e43a3cde --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_unpriv_bpf_disabled.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2022, Oracle and/or its affiliates. */ + +#include "vmlinux.h" + +#include +#include +#include "bpf_misc.h" + +__u32 perfbuf_val = 0; +__u32 ringbuf_val = 0; + +int test_pid; + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u32); +} array SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u32); +} percpu_array SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u32); +} hash SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u32); +} percpu_hash SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u32); +} perfbuf SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF); + __uint(max_entries, 1 << 12); +} ringbuf SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 1); + __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32)); + __uint(value_size, sizeof(__u32)); +} prog_array SEC(".maps"); + +SEC("fentry/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_nanosleep") +int sys_nanosleep_enter(void *ctx) +{ + int cur_pid; + + cur_pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; + + if (cur_pid != test_pid) + return 0; + + bpf_perf_event_output(ctx, &perfbuf, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, &perfbuf_val, sizeof(perfbuf_val)); + bpf_ringbuf_output(&ringbuf, &ringbuf_val, sizeof(ringbuf_val), 0); + + return 0; +} + +SEC("perf_event") +int handle_perf_event(void *ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";