From 0549cd67b01016b579047bce045b386202a8bcfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Pau Monne Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 11:57:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/3] xen-blkfront: allow discard-* nodes to be optional MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit This is inline with the specification described in blkif.h: * discard-granularity: should be set to the physical block size if node is not present. * discard-alignment, discard-secure: should be set to 0 if node not present. This was detected as QEMU would only create the discard-granularity node but not discard-alignment, and thus the setup done in blkfront_setup_discard would fail. Fix blkfront_setup_discard to not fail on missing nodes, and also fix blkif_set_queue_limits to set the discard granularity to the physical block size if none is specified in xenbus. Fixes: ed30bf317c5ce ('xen-blkfront: Handle discard requests.') Reported-by: Arthur Borsboom Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Tested-By: Arthur Borsboom Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210119105727.95173-1-roger.pau@citrix.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross --- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 20 +++++++------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c index 34b028be78ab1..1ee9545ea2f11 100644 --- a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c @@ -945,7 +945,8 @@ static void blkif_set_queue_limits(struct blkfront_info *info) if (info->feature_discard) { blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD, rq); blk_queue_max_discard_sectors(rq, get_capacity(gd)); - rq->limits.discard_granularity = info->discard_granularity; + rq->limits.discard_granularity = info->discard_granularity ?: + info->physical_sector_size; rq->limits.discard_alignment = info->discard_alignment; if (info->feature_secdiscard) blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_SECERASE, rq); @@ -2179,19 +2180,12 @@ static void blkfront_closing(struct blkfront_info *info) static void blkfront_setup_discard(struct blkfront_info *info) { - int err; - unsigned int discard_granularity; - unsigned int discard_alignment; - info->feature_discard = 1; - err = xenbus_gather(XBT_NIL, info->xbdev->otherend, - "discard-granularity", "%u", &discard_granularity, - "discard-alignment", "%u", &discard_alignment, - NULL); - if (!err) { - info->discard_granularity = discard_granularity; - info->discard_alignment = discard_alignment; - } + info->discard_granularity = xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend, + "discard-granularity", + 0); + info->discard_alignment = xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend, + "discard-alignment", 0); info->feature_secdiscard = !!xenbus_read_unsigned(info->xbdev->otherend, "discard-secure", 0); From 5f46400f7a6a4fad635d5a79e2aa5a04a30ffea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Woodhouse Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 17:01:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/3] xen: Fix XenStore initialisation for XS_LOCAL In commit 3499ba8198ca ("xen: Fix event channel callback via INTX/GSI") I reworked the triggering of xenbus_probe(). I tried to simplify things by taking out the workqueue based startup triggered from wake_waiting(); the somewhat poorly named xenbus IRQ handler. I missed the fact that in the XS_LOCAL case (Dom0 starting its own xenstored or xenstore-stubdom, which happens after the kernel is booted completely), that IRQ-based trigger is still actually needed. So... put it back, except more cleanly. By just spawning a xenbus_probe thread which waits on xb_waitq and runs the probe the first time it gets woken, just as the workqueue-based hack did. This is actually a nicer approach for *all* the back ends with different interrupt methods, and we can switch them all over to that without the complex conditions for when to trigger it. But not in -rc6. This is the minimal fix for the regression, although it's a step in the right direction instead of doing a partial revert and actually putting the workqueue back. It's also simpler than the workqueue. Fixes: 3499ba8198ca ("xen: Fix event channel callback via INTX/GSI") Reported-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4c9af052a6e0f6485d1de43f2c38b1461996db99.camel@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross --- drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c index c8f0282bb6497..18ffd0551b542 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_probe.c @@ -714,6 +714,23 @@ static bool xs_hvm_defer_init_for_callback(void) #endif } +static int xenbus_probe_thread(void *unused) +{ + DEFINE_WAIT(w); + + /* + * We actually just want to wait for *any* trigger of xb_waitq, + * and run xenbus_probe() the moment it occurs. + */ + prepare_to_wait(&xb_waitq, &w, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + schedule(); + finish_wait(&xb_waitq, &w); + + DPRINTK("probing"); + xenbus_probe(); + return 0; +} + static int __init xenbus_probe_initcall(void) { /* @@ -725,6 +742,20 @@ static int __init xenbus_probe_initcall(void) !xs_hvm_defer_init_for_callback())) xenbus_probe(); + /* + * For XS_LOCAL, spawn a thread which will wait for xenstored + * or a xenstore-stubdom to be started, then probe. It will be + * triggered when communication starts happening, by waiting + * on xb_waitq. + */ + if (xen_store_domain_type == XS_LOCAL) { + struct task_struct *probe_task; + + probe_task = kthread_run(xenbus_probe_thread, NULL, + "xenbus_probe"); + if (IS_ERR(probe_task)) + return PTR_ERR(probe_task); + } return 0; } device_initcall(xenbus_probe_initcall); From 2e92493637a09547734f92c62a2471f6f0cb9a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Gross Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2021 14:42:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 3/3] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled When booting a kernel which has been built with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled as a Xen pv guest a warning is issued for each processor: [ 5.964347] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 5.968314] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /home/gross/linux/head/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:660 get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90 [ 5.972321] Modules linked in: [ 5.976313] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 5.11.0-rc5-default #75 [ 5.980313] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9020/0PC5F7, BIOS A05 12/05/2013 [ 5.984313] RIP: e030:get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90 [ 5.988313] Code: 42 10 83 f0 01 85 f6 74 04 84 c0 75 1d b8 01 00 00 00 c3 48 3d 00 80 83 82 72 08 48 3d 20 81 83 82 72 0c b8 01 00 00 00 eb db <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 2d 00 80 83 82 48 ba 72 1c c7 71 1c c7 71 1c 48 [ 5.992313] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040033d38 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5.996313] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff82a141d0 RCX: ffffffff8222ec38 [ 6.000312] RDX: ffffffff8222ec38 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffc90040033d40 [ 6.004313] RBP: ffff8881003984a0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: ffff888100398000 [ 6.008312] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffc90040246000 R12: ffff8884082182a8 [ 6.012313] R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 000000000000001d R15: ffff8881003982d0 [ 6.016316] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888408200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.020313] CS: e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.024313] CR2: ffffc900020ef000 CR3: 000000000220a000 CR4: 0000000000050660 [ 6.028314] Call Trace: [ 6.032313] cvt_gate_to_trap.part.7+0x3f/0x90 [ 6.036313] ? asm_exc_double_fault+0x30/0x30 [ 6.040313] xen_convert_trap_info+0x87/0xd0 [ 6.044313] xen_pv_cpu_up+0x17a/0x450 [ 6.048313] bringup_cpu+0x2b/0xc0 [ 6.052313] ? cpus_read_trylock+0x50/0x50 [ 6.056313] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x80/0x4c0 [ 6.060313] _cpu_up+0xa7/0x140 [ 6.064313] cpu_up+0x98/0xd0 [ 6.068313] bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60 [ 6.072313] smp_init+0x26/0x79 [ 6.076313] kernel_init_freeable+0x103/0x258 [ 6.080313] ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0 [ 6.084313] kernel_init+0xa/0x110 [ 6.088313] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 6.092313] ---[ end trace be9ecf17dceeb4f3 ]--- Reason is that there is no Xen pv trap entry for X86_TRAP_VC. Fix that by adding a generic trap handler for unknown traps and wire all unknown bare metal handlers to this generic handler, which will just crash the system in case such a trap will ever happen. Fixes: 0786138c78e793 ("x86/sev-es: Add a Runtime #VC Exception Handler") Cc: # v5.10 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross --- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 1 + arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 1 + 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h index b2442eb0ac2f8..eb01c2618a9df 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h @@ -616,6 +616,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(X86_TRAP_VC, exc_vmm_communication); #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB(X86_TRAP_OTHER, exc_xen_hypervisor_callback); +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_OTHER, exc_xen_unknown_trap); #endif /* Device interrupts common/spurious */ diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c index 4409306364dc3..9a5a50cdaab59 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -583,6 +583,13 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug) exc_debug(regs); } +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap) +{ + /* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */ + pr_err("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode."); + BUG(); +} + struct trap_array_entry { void (*orig)(void); void (*xen)(void); @@ -631,6 +638,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist) { unsigned int nr; bool ist_okay = false; + bool found = false; /* * Replace trap handler addresses by Xen specific ones. @@ -645,6 +653,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist) if (*addr == entry->orig) { *addr = entry->xen; ist_okay = entry->ist_okay; + found = true; break; } } @@ -655,9 +664,13 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist) nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) / EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE; *addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr]; + found = true; } - if (WARN_ON(ist != 0 && !ist_okay)) + if (!found) + *addr = (void *)xen_asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap; + + if (WARN_ON(found && ist != 0 && !ist_okay)) return false; return true; diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S index 1cb0e84b91610..53cf8aa35032d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ xen_pv_trap asm_exc_simd_coprocessor_error #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION xen_pv_trap entry_INT80_compat #endif +xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_hypervisor_callback __INIT