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yaml
---
r: 146409
b: refs/heads/master
c: b5f22a5
h: refs/heads/master
i:
  146407: 67f4813
v: v3
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Serge E. Hallyn authored and James Morris committed Apr 3, 2009
1 parent 924b263 commit 0947849
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Showing 2 changed files with 33 additions and 1 deletion.
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion [refs]
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
---
refs/heads/master: 3d43321b7015387cfebbe26436d0e9d299162ea1
refs/heads/master: b5f22a59c0356655a501190959db9f7f5dd07e3f
32 changes: 32 additions & 0 deletions trunk/security/commoncap.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -28,6 +28,28 @@
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>

/*
* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
* !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
* However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
* the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
* bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
* to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
* support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
*
* Warn if that happens, once per boot.
*/
static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(char *fname)
{
static int warned;
if (!warned) {
printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
" capabilities.\n", fname);
warned = 1;
}
}

int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -463,6 +485,15 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return ret;

if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (effective && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
Expand All @@ -478,6 +509,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
skip:

/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
Expand Down

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