Skip to content

Commit

Permalink
TPM: Zero buffer after copying to userspace
Browse files Browse the repository at this point in the history
Since the buffer might contain security related data it might be a good idea to
zero the buffer after we have copied it to userspace.

This got assigned CVE-2011-1162.

Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
  • Loading branch information
Peter Huewe authored and James Morris committed Sep 22, 2011
1 parent 6b07d30 commit 3321c07
Showing 1 changed file with 5 additions and 1 deletion.
6 changes: 5 additions & 1 deletion drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1105,6 +1105,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
ssize_t ret_size;
int rc;

del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
flush_work_sync(&chip->work);
Expand All @@ -1115,8 +1116,11 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
ret_size = size;

mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
if (copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size))
rc = copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size);
memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, ret_size);
if (rc)
ret_size = -EFAULT;

mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
}

Expand Down

0 comments on commit 3321c07

Please sign in to comment.