xfrm: add LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR statistic counter

When host ping its peer, ICMP echo request packet triggers IPsec
policy, then host negotiates SA secret with its peer. After IKE
installed SA for OUT direction, but before SA for IN direction
installed, host get ICMP echo reply from its peer. At the time
being, the SA state for IN direction could be XFRM_STATE_ACQ,
then the received packet will be dropped after adding
LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEINVALID statistic.

Adding a LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR statistic counter for such
scenario when SA in larval state is much clearer for user than
LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEINVALID which indicates the SA is totally
bad.

Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

include/uapi/linux/snmp.h

@@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ enum
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTPOLERROR,		/* XfrmOutPolError */
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR,		/* XfrmFwdHdrError*/
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID,		/* XfrmOutStateInvalid */
+	LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR,		/* XfrmAcquireError */
 	__LINUX_MIB_XFRMMAX
 };
 

net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c

@@ -163,6 +163,11 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 		skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len++] = x;
 
 		spin_lock(&x->lock);
+		if (unlikely(x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ACQ)) {
+			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR);
+			goto drop_unlock;
+		}
+
 		if (unlikely(x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)) {
 			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEINVALID);
 			goto drop_unlock;

net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib xfrm_mib_list[] = {
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutPolError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTPOLERROR),
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmFwdHdrError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR),
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateInvalid", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID),
+	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmAcquireError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR),
 	SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL
 };