---

yaml --- r: 311731 b: refs/heads/master c: 7db5b3c h: refs/heads/master i: 311729: 4346c44 311727: 2495d2d v: v3
git-mirror · Jul 7, 2012 · f2662fd · f2662fd
1 parent 4c16001
commit f2662fd
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Showing 6 changed files with 8 additions and 28 deletions.
diff --git a/[refs] b/[refs]
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-refs/heads/master: bd0a521e88aa7a06ae7aabaed7ae196ed4ad867a
+refs/heads/master: 7db5b3ca0ecdb2e8fad52a4770e4e320e61c77a6
diff --git a/trunk/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt b/trunk/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt
@@ -25,13 +25,6 @@ bits will no longer change the uid or gid; file capabilities will not
 add to the permitted set, and LSMs will not relax constraints after
 execve.
 
-To set no_new_privs, use prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0).
-
-Be careful, though: LSMs might also not tighten constraints on exec
-in no_new_privs mode.  (This means that setting up a general-purpose
-service launcher to set no_new_privs before execing daemons may
-interfere with LSM-based sandboxing.)
-
 Note that no_new_privs does not prevent privilege changes that do not
 involve execve.  An appropriately privileged task can still call
 setuid(2) and receive SCM_RIGHTS datagrams.

diff --git a/trunk/Makefile b/trunk/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 VERSION = 3
 PATCHLEVEL = 5
 SUBLEVEL = 0
-EXTRAVERSION = -rc6
+EXTRAVERSION = -rc5
 NAME = Saber-toothed Squirrel
 
 # *DOCUMENTATION*

diff --git a/trunk/fs/open.c b/trunk/fs/open.c
@@ -397,10 +397,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 {
 	struct file *file;
 	struct inode *inode;
-	int error, fput_needed;
+	int error;
 
 	error = -EBADF;
-	file = fget_raw_light(fd, &fput_needed);
+	file = fget(fd);
 	if (!file)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path);
 out_putf:
-	fput_light(file, fput_needed);
+	fput(file);
 out:
 	return error;
 }

diff --git a/trunk/include/linux/prctl.h b/trunk/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -141,8 +141,6 @@
  * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege.  So, for example,
  * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
  * in execve returning -EPERM.
- *
- * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
  */
 #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	38
 #define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	39

diff --git a/trunk/kernel/cgroup.c b/trunk/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -901,13 +901,10 @@ static void cgroup_diput(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
 
 		/*
-		 * We want to drop the active superblock reference from the
-		 * cgroup creation after all the dentry refs are gone -
-		 * kill_sb gets mighty unhappy otherwise.  Mark
-		 * dentry->d_fsdata with cgroup_diput() to tell
-		 * cgroup_d_release() to call deactivate_super().
+		 * Drop the active superblock reference that we took when we
+		 * created the cgroup
 		 */
-		dentry->d_fsdata = cgroup_diput;
+		deactivate_super(cgrp->root->sb);
 
 		/*
 		 * if we're getting rid of the cgroup, refcount should ensure
@@ -933,13 +930,6 @@ static int cgroup_delete(const struct dentry *d)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static void cgroup_d_release(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	/* did cgroup_diput() tell me to deactivate super? */
-	if (dentry->d_fsdata == cgroup_diput)
-		deactivate_super(dentry->d_sb);
-}
-
 static void remove_dir(struct dentry *d)
 {
 	struct dentry *parent = dget(d->d_parent);
@@ -1547,7 +1537,6 @@ static int cgroup_get_rootdir(struct super_block *sb)
 	static const struct dentry_operations cgroup_dops = {
 		.d_iput = cgroup_diput,
 		.d_delete = cgroup_delete,
-		.d_release = cgroup_d_release,
 	};
 
 	struct inode *inode =