openssh: Update version from 7.5 to 7.9

From the [announcement][1]:

> Potentially-incompatible changes
> ================================
>
> This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
> configurations:
>
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms
>    option (see below) bans the use of DSA keys as certificate
>    authorities.
>
>  * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has
>    changed format slightly. It now includes the certificate
>    fingerprint (previously it included only key ID and CA key
>    fingerprint).
>
> Changes since OpenSSH 7.8
> =========================
>
> This is primarily a bugfix release.
>
> New Features
> ------------
>
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): allow most port numbers to be specified using
>    service names from getservbyname(3) (typically /etc/services).
>
>  * ssh(1): allow the IdentityAgent configuration directive to accept
>    environment variable names. This supports the use of multiple
>    agent sockets without needing to use fixed paths.
>
>  * sshd(8): support signalling sessions via the SSH protocol.
>    A limited subset of signals is supported and only for login or
>    command sessions (i.e. not subsystems) that were not subject to
>    a forced command via authorized_keys or sshd_config. bz#1424
>
>  * ssh(1): support "ssh -Q sig" to list supported signature options.
>    Also "ssh -Q help" to show the full set of supported queries.
>
>  * ssh(1), sshd(8): add a CASignatureAlgorithms option for the
>    client and server configs to allow control over which signature
>    formats are allowed for CAs to sign certificates. For example,
>    this allows banning CAs that sign certificates using the RSA-SHA1
>    signature algorithm.
>
>  * sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): allow key revocation lists (KRLs) to
>    revoke keys specified by SHA256 hash.
>
>  * ssh-keygen(1): allow creation of key revocation lists directly
>    from base64-encoded SHA256 fingerprints. This supports revoking
>    keys using only the information contained in sshd(8)
>    authentication log messages.
>
> Bugfixes
> --------
>
>  * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): avoid spurious "invalid format" errors when
>    attempting to load PEM private keys while using an incorrect
>    passphrase. bz#2901
>
>  * sshd(8): when a channel closed message is received from a client,
>    close the stderr file descriptor at the same time stdout is
>    closed. This avoids stuck processes if they were waiting for
>    stderr to close and were insensitive to stdin/out closing. bz#2863
>
>  * ssh(1): allow ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the untrusted X11
>    forwarding timeout and support X11 forwarding indefinitely.
>    Previously the behaviour of ForwardX11Timeout=0 was undefined.
>
>  * sshd(8): when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method
>    OIDs regardless of whether GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the
>    main section of sshd_config. This avoids sandbox violations if
>    GSSAPI authentication was later enabled in a Match block. bz#2107
>
>  * sshd(8): do not fail closed when configured with a text key
>    revocation list that contains a too-short key. bz#2897
>
>  * ssh(1): treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as
>    ones with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname
>    canonicalisation (i.e. don't try to canonicalise the hostname
>    unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to 'always'). bz#2896
>
>  * ssh(1): fix regression in OpenSSH 7.8 that could prevent public-
>    key authentication using certificates hosted in a ssh-agent(1)
>    or against sshd(8) from OpenSSH <7.8.
>
> Portability
> -----------
>
>  * All: support building against the openssl-1.1 API (releases 1.1.0g
>    and later). The openssl-1.0 API will remain supported at least
>    until OpenSSL terminates security patch support for that API version.
>
>  * sshd(8): allow the futex(2) syscall in the Linux seccomp sandbox;
>    apparently required by some glibc/OpenSSL combinations.
>
>  * sshd(8): handle getgrouplist(3) returning more than
>    _SC_NGROUPS_MAX groups. Some platforms consider this limit more
>    as a guideline.

[1]: https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-announce/2018-October/000135.html

openssh.be0

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/bin/env beesh
 
-# BEE_VERSION openssh-7.5_p1-0
+# BEE_VERSION openssh-7.9_p1-0
 
 SRCURL[0]="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PKGVERSION}${PKGEXTRAVERSION}.tar.gz"