openssl1: Update version from 1.1.1b to 1.1.1c

From the [news][1]:

> Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019]
>
>   *) Add build tests for C++.  These are generated files that only do one
>      thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each.  This tests that
>      the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.
>
>      This test isn't enabled by default.  It can be enabled with the option
>      'enable-buildtest-c++'.
>      [Richard Levitte]
>
>   *) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.
>      [Patrick Steuer]
>
>   *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
>      This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
>      fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
>      generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
>      [Kurt Roeckx]
>
>   *) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES,
>      EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust
>      util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.
>      [Paul Yang, Joshua Lock]
>
>   *) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()
>      [Matt Caswell]
>
>   *) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme
>      along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.
>      [Lorinczy Zsigmond]
>
>   *) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.
>      [Richard Levitte]
>
>   *) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.
>      [Bernd Edlinger]
>
>   *) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
>
>      ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
>      for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
>      (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
>      and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
>      bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
>      bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
>      additional leading bytes are ignored.
>
>      It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
>      unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
>      serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
>      the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
>      change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
>      new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
>      messages with a reused nonce.
>
>      Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
>      integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
>      integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
>      affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
>      is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
>      applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
>      length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
>
>      This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
>      Greef of Ronomon.
>      (CVE-2019-1543)
>      [Matt Caswell]
>
>   *) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
>      [Paul Yang]

[1]: https://www.openssl.org/news/cl111.txt

openssl1.be0

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env beesh
 
-# BEE_VERSION openssl1-1.1.1b-0
+# BEE_VERSION openssl1-1.1.1c-0
 
 ## this file was created by bee init and should be executed to build a
 ## bee-package. (Additional hints are located at the end of this file.)