lua: Add version 5.3.2 #3
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Also use the new build instructions from Linux from Scratch [1], building a shared library, needed for the window manager *awesome*. [1] http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/7.9/general/lua.html
| cp -v ${S}/doc/*.{html,css,gif,png} ${D}${DOCDIR} | ||
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| mkdir -pv ${D}/${LIBDIR}/pkgconfig | ||
| install -v -m644 -D ${B}/lua.pc ${D}${LIBDIR}/pkgconfig |
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@wwwutz, benutzt Ihr immer ein / zwischen den Variablen, obwohl dort selbest schon einer enthalten ist?
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pure Schlamperei, Ignoranz und Rechenzeitverschwendung. Wir hamms ja 8).
8-)
donald
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May 29, 2017
Update to latest available version before investigating further
into the heap corruption problem.
#1 0x00007f7685167748 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:89
#2 0x00007f76851a967d in __malloc_assert (assertion=assertion@entry=0x7f7685299470 "(unsigned long) (size) >= (unsigned long) (nb)",
file=file@entry=0x7f7685295065 "malloc.c", line=line@entry=3692, function=function@entry=0x7f76852953ed <__func__.11515> "_int_malloc")
at malloc.c:293
#3 0x00007f76851ac51a in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7f7648000020, bytes=bytes@entry=2049) at malloc.c:3692
#4 0x00007f76851acbe1 in _int_realloc (av=av@entry=0x7f7648000020, oldp=oldp@entry=0x7f76480019a0, oldsize=oldsize@entry=1040,
nb=nb@entry=2064) at malloc.c:4283
#5 0x00007f76851add19 in __GI___libc_realloc (oldmem=0x7f76480019b0, bytes=2049) at malloc.c:3026
#6 0x000055a920baef28 in set_tsd_user_vars ()
#7 0x000055a920b9d2b4 in ?? ()
#8 0x00007f76863a9191 in start_thread (arg=0x7f767c1de700) at pthread_create.c:309
#9 0x00007f768521930d in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:111
pmenzel
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Dec 19, 2017
From [1]: > Optional patch: > http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/patches/blfs/7.10/wireshark-2.0.5-lua_5_3_1-1.patch > (allows building the LUA bindings if Lua-5.3.3 is installed and LUA is > not disabled by passing --without-lua to configure) Applies with a little offset. ``` [BEE] patch -N -p1 -i /dev/shm/bee-root/wireshark/files/wireshark-2.0.5-lua_5_3_1-1.patch patching file configure Hunk #1 succeeded at 38870 (offset 1275 lines). Hunk #2 succeeded at 38974 (offset 1275 lines). Hunk #3 succeeded at 38998 (offset 1275 lines). Hunk #4 succeeded at 39022 (offset 1275 lines). patching file epan/wslua/lua_bitop.c patching file epan/wslua/wslua_byte_array.c patching file epan/wslua/wslua_file.c Hunk #1 succeeded at 347 (offset 10 lines). patching file epan/wslua/wslua.h patching file epan/wslua/wslua_int64.c patching file epan/wslua/wslua_internals.c patching file epan/wslua/wslua_listener.c patching file epan/wslua/wslua_nstime.c patching file epan/wslua/wslua_struct.c patching file epan/wslua/wslua_tvb.c Hunk #3 succeeded at 223 (offset -1 lines). Hunk #4 succeeded at 241 (offset -1 lines). Hunk #5 succeeded at 836 (offset -1 lines). Hunk #6 succeeded at 917 (offset -1 lines). Hunk #7 succeeded at 961 (offset -1 lines). Hunk #8 succeeded at 1008 (offset -1 lines). Hunk #9 succeeded at 1108 (offset -1 lines). ``` With this patch, `Use Lua library : yes` is seen in the configure option summary. [1] http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/7.10/basicnet/wireshark.html
pmenzel
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Jun 18, 2019
This fixes *Linux and FreeBSD Kernel: Multiple TCP-based remote denial of service issues* [1]. > Netflix has identified several TCP networking vulnerabilities in FreeBSD > and Linux kernels. > > The vulnerabilities specifically relate to the minimum segment size (MSS) > and TCP Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) capabilities. The most serious, > dubbed “SACK Panic,” allows a remotely-triggered kernel panic on recent > Linux kernels. > > There are patches that address most of these vulnerabilities. If patches > can not be applied, certain mitigations will be effective. We recommend > that affected parties enact one of those described below, based on their > environment. > > #1: CVE-2019-11477: SACK Panic (Linux >= 2.6.29) > > Description: A sequence of SACKs may be crafted such that one can trigger > an integer overflow, leading to a kernel panic. > > Fix: Apply the attached patch (“PATCH_net_1_4.patch”). Additionally, > versions of the Linux kernel up to, and including, 4.14 require a second > patch (“PATCH_net_1a.patch”). > > Workaround #1: Block connections with a low MSS using one of the attached > filters. (The values in the filters are examples. You can apply a higher or > lower limit, as appropriate for your environment.) Note that these filters > may break legitimate connections which rely on a low MSS. Also, note that > this mitigation is only effective if TCP probing is disabled (that is, the > net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing sysctl is set to 0, which appears to be the > default value for that sysctl). > > Workaround #2: Disable SACK processing (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_sack set to > 0). > > (Note that either workaround should be sufficient on its own. It is not > necessary to apply both workarounds.) > > > #2: CVE-2019-11478: SACK Slowness (Linux < 4.15) or Excess Resource Usage > (all Linux versions) > > Description: It is possible to send a crafted sequence of SACKs which will > fragment the TCP retransmission queue. On Linux kernels prior to 4.15, an > attacker may be able to further exploit the fragmented queue to cause an > expensive linked-list walk for subsequent SACKs received for that same TCP > connection. > > Fix: Apply the attached patch (“PATCH_net_2_4.patch”) > > Workaround #1: Block connections with a low MSS using one of the attached > filters. (The values in the filters are examples. You can apply a higher or > lower limit, as appropriate for your environment.) Note that these filters > may break legitimate connections which rely on a low MSS. Also, note that > this mitigation is only effective if TCP probing is disabled (that is, the > net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing sysctl is set to 0, which appears to be the > default value for that sysctl). > > Workaround #2: Disable SACK processing (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_sack set to > 0). > > (Note that either workaround should be sufficient on its own. It is not > necessary to apply both workarounds.) > > > #3: CVE-2019-5599: SACK Slowness (FreeBSD 12 using the RACK TCP Stack) > > Description: It is possible to send a crafted sequence of SACKs which will > fragment the RACK send map. An attacker may be able to further exploit the > fragmented send map to cause an expensive linked-list walk for subsequent > SACKs received for that same TCP connection. > > Workaround #1: Apply the attached patch (“split_limit.patch”) and set the > net.inet.tcp.rack.split_limit sysctl to a reasonable value to limit the > size of the SACK table. > > Workaround #2: Temporarily disable the RACK TCP stack. > > (Note that either workaround should be sufficient on its own. It is not > necessary to apply both workarounds.) > > > #4: CVE-2019-11479: Excess Resource Consumption Due to Low MSS Values (all > Linux versions) > > Description: An attacker can force the Linux kernel to segment its > responses into multiple TCP segments, each of which contains only 8 bytes > of data. This drastically increases the bandwidth required to deliver the > same amount of data. Further, it consumes additional resources (CPU and NIC > processing power). This attack requires continued effort from the attacker > and the impacts will end shortly after the attacker stops sending traffic. > > Fix: Two attached patches (“PATCH_net_3_4.patch” and “PATCH_net_4_4.patch”) > add a sysctl which enforces a minimum MSS, set by the > net.ipv4.tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl. This lets an administrator enforce a > minimum MSS appropriate for their applications. > > Workaround: Block connections with a low MSS using one of the attached > filters. (The values in the filters are examples. You can apply a higher or > lower limit, as appropriate for your environment.) Note that these filters > may break legitimate connections which rely on a low MSS. Also, note that > this mitigation is only effective if TCP probing is disabled (that is, the > net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing sysctl is set to 0, which appears to be the > default value for that sysctl). > > > Note: Good system and application coding and configuration practices > (limiting write buffers to the necessary level, monitoring connection > memory consumption via SO_MEMINFO, and aggressively closing misbehaving > connections) can help to limit the impact of attacks against these kinds of > vulnerabilities. > > An advisory has been published > at https://github.com/Netflix/security-bulletins/blob/master/advisories/third-party/2019-001.md > > Acknowledgments: > Originally reported by Jonathan Looney. > We thank Eric Dumazet for providing Linux fixes and support. > We thank Bruce Curtis for providing the Linux filters. > We thank Jonathan Lemon and Alexey Kodanev for helping to improve the Linux > patches. > We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Tyler Hicks in testing fixes, > refining the information about vulnerable versions, and providing > assistance during the disclosure process. > > Regards, > Netflix Information Security [1]: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/06/17/5
pmenzel
added a commit
that referenced
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Jun 18, 2019
This fixes *Linux and FreeBSD Kernel: Multiple TCP-based remote denial of service issues* [1]. > Netflix has identified several TCP networking vulnerabilities in FreeBSD > and Linux kernels. > > The vulnerabilities specifically relate to the minimum segment size (MSS) > and TCP Selective Acknowledgement (SACK) capabilities. The most serious, > dubbed “SACK Panic,” allows a remotely-triggered kernel panic on recent > Linux kernels. > > There are patches that address most of these vulnerabilities. If patches > can not be applied, certain mitigations will be effective. We recommend > that affected parties enact one of those described below, based on their > environment. > > #1: CVE-2019-11477: SACK Panic (Linux >= 2.6.29) > > Description: A sequence of SACKs may be crafted such that one can trigger > an integer overflow, leading to a kernel panic. > > Fix: Apply the attached patch (“PATCH_net_1_4.patch”). Additionally, > versions of the Linux kernel up to, and including, 4.14 require a second > patch (“PATCH_net_1a.patch”). > > Workaround #1: Block connections with a low MSS using one of the attached > filters. (The values in the filters are examples. You can apply a higher or > lower limit, as appropriate for your environment.) Note that these filters > may break legitimate connections which rely on a low MSS. Also, note that > this mitigation is only effective if TCP probing is disabled (that is, the > net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing sysctl is set to 0, which appears to be the > default value for that sysctl). > > Workaround #2: Disable SACK processing (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_sack set to > 0). > > (Note that either workaround should be sufficient on its own. It is not > necessary to apply both workarounds.) > > > #2: CVE-2019-11478: SACK Slowness (Linux < 4.15) or Excess Resource Usage > (all Linux versions) > > Description: It is possible to send a crafted sequence of SACKs which will > fragment the TCP retransmission queue. On Linux kernels prior to 4.15, an > attacker may be able to further exploit the fragmented queue to cause an > expensive linked-list walk for subsequent SACKs received for that same TCP > connection. > > Fix: Apply the attached patch (“PATCH_net_2_4.patch”) > > Workaround #1: Block connections with a low MSS using one of the attached > filters. (The values in the filters are examples. You can apply a higher or > lower limit, as appropriate for your environment.) Note that these filters > may break legitimate connections which rely on a low MSS. Also, note that > this mitigation is only effective if TCP probing is disabled (that is, the > net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing sysctl is set to 0, which appears to be the > default value for that sysctl). > > Workaround #2: Disable SACK processing (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_sack set to > 0). > > (Note that either workaround should be sufficient on its own. It is not > necessary to apply both workarounds.) > > > #3: CVE-2019-5599: SACK Slowness (FreeBSD 12 using the RACK TCP Stack) > > Description: It is possible to send a crafted sequence of SACKs which will > fragment the RACK send map. An attacker may be able to further exploit the > fragmented send map to cause an expensive linked-list walk for subsequent > SACKs received for that same TCP connection. > > Workaround #1: Apply the attached patch (“split_limit.patch”) and set the > net.inet.tcp.rack.split_limit sysctl to a reasonable value to limit the > size of the SACK table. > > Workaround #2: Temporarily disable the RACK TCP stack. > > (Note that either workaround should be sufficient on its own. It is not > necessary to apply both workarounds.) > > > #4: CVE-2019-11479: Excess Resource Consumption Due to Low MSS Values (all > Linux versions) > > Description: An attacker can force the Linux kernel to segment its > responses into multiple TCP segments, each of which contains only 8 bytes > of data. This drastically increases the bandwidth required to deliver the > same amount of data. Further, it consumes additional resources (CPU and NIC > processing power). This attack requires continued effort from the attacker > and the impacts will end shortly after the attacker stops sending traffic. > > Fix: Two attached patches (“PATCH_net_3_4.patch” and “PATCH_net_4_4.patch”) > add a sysctl which enforces a minimum MSS, set by the > net.ipv4.tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl. This lets an administrator enforce a > minimum MSS appropriate for their applications. > > Workaround: Block connections with a low MSS using one of the attached > filters. (The values in the filters are examples. You can apply a higher or > lower limit, as appropriate for your environment.) Note that these filters > may break legitimate connections which rely on a low MSS. Also, note that > this mitigation is only effective if TCP probing is disabled (that is, the > net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing sysctl is set to 0, which appears to be the > default value for that sysctl). > > > Note: Good system and application coding and configuration practices > (limiting write buffers to the necessary level, monitoring connection > memory consumption via SO_MEMINFO, and aggressively closing misbehaving > connections) can help to limit the impact of attacks against these kinds of > vulnerabilities. > > An advisory has been published > at https://github.com/Netflix/security-bulletins/blob/master/advisories/third-party/2019-001.md > > Acknowledgments: > Originally reported by Jonathan Looney. > We thank Eric Dumazet for providing Linux fixes and support. > We thank Bruce Curtis for providing the Linux filters. > We thank Jonathan Lemon and Alexey Kodanev for helping to improve the Linux > patches. > We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Tyler Hicks in testing fixes, > refining the information about vulnerable versions, and providing > assistance during the disclosure process. > > Regards, > Netflix Information Security The other commits between 4.19.40 and 4.19.52 can be found in the [git repository][2]. [1]: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/06/17/5 [2]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/log/?h=linux-4.19.y
pmenzel
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Jun 21, 2019
From the [NEWS][1]: > 3.32.0 > - pretty version number > 3.31.91 > - symbolic: folder-download, inode-directory > - symbolic: privacy, dnd, phone device icons > - symbolic: new ui context for things that aren't strictly icons. Might go into gtk > - symbolic: emoji category tweaks > - symbolic: mail-reply, battery status (issue #6) > - symbolic: action icons eg rotation > - symbolic: drive icon tweaks > - fullcolor: more app/mimetype/device/status to legacy > - fullcolor: new style for fullcolor icons - folders, mimetypes and devices > - cursors: fix a symlink mixup (mr #5) > > 3.31.1 > - few symbolic updates > - move a lot of fullcolor icons to legacy context. They will go or be updated > in 2 releases. > - symbolic: lists (issue #16) > - fullcolor: more app, device, mimetypes to legacy > 3.30.0 > - audio-speakers-symbolic rendering glitch (issue #11) > - *starred-symbolic 2px outline as per guidelines (issue #7) > > 3.29.90 > - symbolic fingerprint, smartcard reader devices > - emoji category icons in symbolic form > - render script improvements by Sam Hewitt > - general cleanup and maintenance by Sam > - SIM status icons (symbolic) > - system-log-out-symbolic > - screen sharing status (issue #3) > - thicked strokes for *starred-symbolic (issue #4) > - iput-gaming and application-games consistent (Sam) > - bluetooth rendering fix (Sam) > - application-x-appliance alignment (Sam) > - tab-new, application-x-executable improvements (Sam) > - user-bookmarks metaphor (Sam) > - general grid alignment fixes by Sam > - SVG filesize optimalizations by Sam > > 3.28.0 > 3.27.90 > - camera-switch-symbolic (bug #750285) > - highres sizing issue (bug #785574) > - vpn-noroute > - optional zopfli png optimizer > - audio-volume-* fuzzy (bug #709131) > - audio-volume-overamplified > - new metaphors for settings -- notifications, volume and privacy [1]: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/adwaita-icon-theme/blob/master/NEWS
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