Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "This is a large update by KVM standards, including AMD PSP (Platform Security Processor, aka "AMD Secure Technology") and ARM CoreSight (debug and trace) changes. ARM: - CoreSight: Add support for ETE and TRBE - Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected mode - Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode - Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode - ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1 - nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces - Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver - Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler x86: - AMD PSP driver changes - Optimizations and cleanup of nested SVM code - AMD: Support for virtual SPEC_CTRL - Optimizations of the new MMU code: fast invalidation, zap under read lock, enable/disably dirty page logging under read lock - /dev/kvm API for AMD SEV live migration (guest API coming soon) - support SEV virtual machines sharing the same encryption context - support SGX in virtual machines - add a few more statistics - improved directed yield heuristics - Lots and lots of cleanups Generic: - Rework of MMU notifier interface, simplifying and optimizing the architecture-specific code - a handful of "Get rid of oprofile leftovers" patches - Some selftests improvements" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (379 commits) KVM: selftests: Speed up set_memory_region_test selftests: kvm: Fix the check of return value KVM: x86: Take advantage of kvm_arch_dy_has_pending_interrupt() KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported) KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c KVM: SVM: Disable SEV/SEV-ES if NPT is disabled KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled' KVM: x86: Move reverse CPUID helpers to separate header file KVM: x86: Rename GPR accessors to make mode-aware variants the defaults ...
mariux64 · May 1, 2021 · 152d32a · 152d32a
2 parents 4f97010 + 3bf0fcd
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diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-coresight-devices-trbe b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-coresight-devices-trbe
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+What:		/sys/bus/coresight/devices/trbe<cpu>/align
+Date:		March 2021
+KernelVersion:	5.13
+Contact:	Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
+Description:	(Read) Shows the TRBE write pointer alignment. This value
+		is fetched from the TRBIDR register.
+
+What:		/sys/bus/coresight/devices/trbe<cpu>/flag
+Date:		March 2021
+KernelVersion:	5.13
+Contact:	Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
+Description:	(Read) Shows if TRBE updates in the memory are with access
+		and dirty flag updates as well. This value is fetched from
+		the TRBIDR register.
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only or BSD-2-Clause
+# Copyright 2021, Arm Ltd
+%YAML 1.2
+---
+$id: "http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/ete.yaml#"
+$schema: "http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#"
+
+title: ARM Embedded Trace Extensions
+
+maintainers:
+  - Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
+  - Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
+
+description: |
+  Arm Embedded Trace Extension(ETE) is a per CPU trace component that
+  allows tracing the CPU execution. It overlaps with the CoreSight ETMv4
+  architecture and has extended support for future architecture changes.
+  The trace generated by the ETE could be stored via legacy CoreSight
+  components (e.g, TMC-ETR) or other means (e.g, using a per CPU buffer
+  Arm Trace Buffer Extension (TRBE)). Since the ETE can be connected to
+  legacy CoreSight components, a node must be listed per instance, along
+  with any optional connection graph as per the coresight bindings.
+  See bindings/arm/coresight.txt.
+
+properties:
+  $nodename:
+    pattern: "^ete([0-9a-f]+)$"
+  compatible:
+    items:
+      - const: arm,embedded-trace-extension
+
+  cpu:
+    description: |
+      Handle to the cpu this ETE is bound to.
+    $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/phandle
+
+  out-ports:
+    description: |
+      Output connections from the ETE to legacy CoreSight trace bus.
+    $ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/properties/ports
+    properties:
+      port:
+        description: Output connection from the ETE to legacy CoreSight Trace bus.
+        $ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/properties/port
+
+required:
+  - compatible
+  - cpu
+
+additionalProperties: false
+
+examples:
+
+# An ETE node without legacy CoreSight connections
+  - |
+    ete0 {
+      compatible = "arm,embedded-trace-extension";
+      cpu = <&cpu_0>;
+    };
+# An ETE node with legacy CoreSight connections
+  - |
+   ete1 {
+      compatible = "arm,embedded-trace-extension";
+      cpu = <&cpu_1>;
+
+      out-ports {        /* legacy coresight connection */
+         port {
+             ete1_out_port: endpoint {
+                remote-endpoint = <&funnel_in_port0>;
+             };
+         };
+      };
+   };
+
+...
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only or BSD-2-Clause
+# Copyright 2021, Arm Ltd
+%YAML 1.2
+---
+$id: "http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/trbe.yaml#"
+$schema: "http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#"
+
+title: ARM Trace Buffer Extensions
+
+maintainers:
+  - Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
+
+description: |
+  Arm Trace Buffer Extension (TRBE) is a per CPU component
+  for storing trace generated on the CPU to memory. It is
+  accessed via CPU system registers. The software can verify
+  if it is permitted to use the component by checking the
+  TRBIDR register.
+
+properties:
+  $nodename:
+    const: "trbe"
+  compatible:
+    items:
+      - const: arm,trace-buffer-extension
+
+  interrupts:
+    description: |
+       Exactly 1 PPI must be listed. For heterogeneous systems where
+       TRBE is only supported on a subset of the CPUs, please consult
+       the arm,gic-v3 binding for details on describing a PPI partition.
+    maxItems: 1
+
+required:
+  - compatible
+  - interrupts
+
+additionalProperties: false
+
+examples:
+
+  - |
+   #include <dt-bindings/interrupt-controller/arm-gic.h>
+
+   trbe {
+     compatible = "arm,trace-buffer-extension";
+     interrupts = <GIC_PPI 15 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
+   };
+...
diff --git a/Documentation/trace/coresight/coresight-trbe.rst b/Documentation/trace/coresight/coresight-trbe.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+==============================
+Trace Buffer Extension (TRBE).
+==============================
+
+    :Author:   Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
+    :Date:     November 2020
+
+Hardware Description
+--------------------
+
+Trace Buffer Extension (TRBE) is a percpu hardware which captures in system
+memory, CPU traces generated from a corresponding percpu tracing unit. This
+gets plugged in as a coresight sink device because the corresponding trace
+generators (ETE), are plugged in as source device.
+
+The TRBE is not compliant to CoreSight architecture specifications, but is
+driven via the CoreSight driver framework to support the ETE (which is
+CoreSight compliant) integration.
+
+Sysfs files and directories
+---------------------------
+
+The TRBE devices appear on the existing coresight bus alongside the other
+coresight devices::
+
+	>$ ls /sys/bus/coresight/devices
+	trbe0  trbe1  trbe2 trbe3
+
+The ``trbe<N>`` named TRBEs are associated with a CPU.::
+
+	>$ ls /sys/bus/coresight/devices/trbe0/
+        align flag
+
+*Key file items are:-*
+   * ``align``: TRBE write pointer alignment
+   * ``flag``: TRBE updates memory with access and dirty flags
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ measurement. Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at
 boot, the measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
 expects.
 
+If len is zero on entry, the measurement blob length is written to len and
+uaddr is unused.
+
 Parameters (in): struct  kvm_sev_launch_measure
 
 Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
@@ -271,6 +274,9 @@ report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory and VMSA passed through
 commands and signed with the PEK. The digest returned by the command should match the digest
 used by the guest owner with the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE.
 
+If len is zero on entry, the measurement blob length is written to len and
+uaddr is unused.
+
 Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_attestation
 
 Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
@@ -284,6 +290,143 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
                 __u32 len;
         };
 
+11. KVM_SEV_SEND_START
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_SEND_START command can be used by the hypervisor to create an
+outgoing guest encryption context.
+
+If session_len is zero on entry, the length of the guest session information is
+written to session_len and all other fields are not used.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_start
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+                __u32 policy;                 /* guest policy */
+
+                __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;         /* platform Diffie-Hellman certificate */
+                __u32 pdh_cert_len;
+
+                __u64 plat_certs_uaddr;        /* platform certificate chain */
+                __u32 plat_certs_len;
+
+                __u64 amd_certs_uaddr;        /* AMD certificate */
+                __u32 amd_certs_len;
+
+                __u64 session_uaddr;          /* Guest session information */
+                __u32 session_len;
+        };
+
+12. KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA
+----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to encrypt the
+outgoing guest memory region with the encryption context creating using
+KVM_SEV_SEND_START.
+
+If hdr_len or trans_len are zero on entry, the length of the packet header and
+transport region are written to hdr_len and trans_len respectively, and all
+other fields are not used.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_launch_send_update_data {
+                __u64 hdr_uaddr;        /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+                __u32 hdr_len;
+
+                __u64 guest_uaddr;      /* the source memory region to be encrypted */
+                __u32 guest_len;
+
+                __u64 trans_uaddr;      /* the destination memory region  */
+                __u32 trans_len;
+        };
+
+13. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH
+------------------------
+
+After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can be
+issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+14. KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL
+------------------------
+
+After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can issue the
+SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so that a cancelled
+migration can restart with a new target later.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+15. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START
+-------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context for an incoming SEV guest. To create the encryption context, the user must
+provide a guest policy, the platform public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session
+information.
+
+Parameters: struct  kvm_sev_receive_start (in/out)
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
+                __u32 handle;           /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */
+                __u32 policy;           /* guest's policy */
+
+                __u64 pdh_uaddr;        /* userspace address pointing to the PDH key */
+                __u32 pdh_len;
+
+                __u64 session_uaddr;    /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */
+                __u32 session_len;
+        };
+
+On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value.
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12.
+
+16. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA
+-------------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy
+the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context
+created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+        struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data {
+                __u64 hdr_uaddr;        /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+                __u32 hdr_len;
+
+                __u64 guest_uaddr;      /* the destination guest memory region */
+                __u32 guest_len;
+
+                __u64 trans_uaddr;      /* the incoming buffer memory region  */
+                __u32 trans_len;
+        };
+
+17. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH
+--------------------------
+
+After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command can be
+issued by the hypervisor to make the guest ready for execution.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
 References
 ==========