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bpf: Add sanity check for upper ptr_limit
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Given we know the max possible value of ptr_limit at the time of retrieving
the latter, add basic assertions, so that the verifier can bail out if
anything looks odd and reject the program. Nothing triggered this so far,
but it also does not hurt to have these.

Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Piotr Krysiuk authored and Daniel Borkmann committed Mar 17, 2021
1 parent b5871dc commit 1b1597e
Showing 1 changed file with 8 additions and 3 deletions.
11 changes: 8 additions & 3 deletions kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -5861,10 +5861,14 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
{
bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
(opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
u32 off;
u32 off, max;

switch (ptr_reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_STACK:
/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
* left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
*/
max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
/* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
* unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
*/
Expand All @@ -5873,15 +5877,16 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
else
*ptr_limit = -off - 1;
return 0;
return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
if (mask_to_left) {
*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
} else {
off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
}
return 0;
return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
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