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[SCTP]: Correctly handle AUTH parameters in unexpected INIT
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When processing an unexpected INIT chunk, we do not need to
do any preservation of the old AUTH parameters.  In fact,
doing such preservations will nullify AUTH and allow connection
stealing.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Vlad Yasevich authored and David S. Miller committed Jan 9, 2008
1 parent f691724 commit 6df9cfc
Showing 1 changed file with 0 additions and 22 deletions.
22 changes: 0 additions & 22 deletions net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1309,26 +1309,6 @@ static void sctp_tietags_populate(struct sctp_association *new_asoc,
new_asoc->c.initial_tsn = asoc->c.initial_tsn;
}

static void sctp_auth_params_populate(struct sctp_association *new_asoc,
const struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
/* Only perform this if AUTH extension is enabled */
if (!sctp_auth_enable)
return;

/* We need to provide the same parameter information as
* was in the original INIT. This means that we need to copy
* the HMACS, CHUNKS, and RANDOM parameter from the original
* assocaition.
*/
memcpy(new_asoc->c.auth_random, asoc->c.auth_random,
sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random));
memcpy(new_asoc->c.auth_hmacs, asoc->c.auth_hmacs,
sizeof(asoc->c.auth_hmacs));
memcpy(new_asoc->c.auth_chunks, asoc->c.auth_chunks,
sizeof(asoc->c.auth_chunks));
}

/*
* Compare vtag/tietag values to determine unexpected COOKIE-ECHO
* handling action.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1486,8 +1466,6 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(

sctp_tietags_populate(new_asoc, asoc);

sctp_auth_params_populate(new_asoc, asoc);

/* B) "Z" shall respond immediately with an INIT ACK chunk. */

/* If there are errors need to be reported for unknown parameters,
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