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KEYS: Use common tpm_buf for trusted and asymmetric keys
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Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted
and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also,
remove tpm1_buf code.

Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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Sumit Garg authored and Jarkko Sakkinen committed Nov 12, 2019
1 parent 74edff2 commit c6f61e5
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Showing 3 changed files with 89 additions and 153 deletions.
107 changes: 45 additions & 62 deletions crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -21,17 +21,13 @@
#define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65
#define TPM_ORD_UNBIND 30
#define TPM_ORD_SIGN 60
#define TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE 59
#define TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE 18
#define TPM_UNBIND_SIZE 63
#define TPM_SIGN_SIZE 63

#define TPM_RT_KEY 0x00000001

/*
* Load a TPM key from the blob provided by userspace
*/
static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb,
uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
const unsigned char *keyblob, int keybloblen,
uint32_t *newhandle)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -68,16 +64,13 @@ static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
return ret;

/* build the request buffer */
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE + keybloblen);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2);
store32(tb, keyhandle);
storebytes(tb, keyblob, keybloblen);
store32(tb, authhandle);
storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle);
tpm_buf_append(tb, keyblob, keybloblen);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle);
tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);

ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
Expand All @@ -99,14 +92,11 @@ static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
/*
* Execute the FlushSpecific TPM command
*/
static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t handle)
static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t handle)
{
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC);
store32(tb, handle);
store32(tb, TPM_RT_KEY);
tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, TPM_RT_KEY);

return trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
}
Expand All @@ -115,7 +105,7 @@ static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t handle)
* Decrypt a blob provided by userspace using a specific key handle.
* The handle is a well known handle or previously loaded by e.g. LoadKey2
*/
static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm_buf *tb,
uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen,
void *out, uint32_t outlen)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -155,17 +145,14 @@ static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
return ret;

/* build the request buffer */
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_UNBIND_SIZE + bloblen);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNBIND);
store32(tb, keyhandle);
store32(tb, bloblen);
storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
store32(tb, authhandle);
storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_UNBIND);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, bloblen);
tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle);
tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);

ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -201,7 +188,7 @@ static int tpm_unbind(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
* up to key_length_in_bytes - 11 and not be limited to size 20 like the
* TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_SHA1 signature scheme.
*/
static int tpm_sign(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
static int tpm_sign(struct tpm_buf *tb,
uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth,
const unsigned char *blob, uint32_t bloblen,
void *out, uint32_t outlen)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -241,17 +228,14 @@ static int tpm_sign(struct tpm1_buf *tb,
return ret;

/* build the request buffer */
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_SIGN_SIZE + bloblen);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SIGN);
store32(tb, keyhandle);
store32(tb, bloblen);
storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
store32(tb, authhandle);
storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
store8(tb, cont);
storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SIGN);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, bloblen);
tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen);
tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle);
tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont);
tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);

ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -519,7 +503,7 @@ static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk,
struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out)
{
struct tpm1_buf *tb;
struct tpm_buf tb;
uint32_t keyhandle;
uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
Expand All @@ -533,14 +517,14 @@ static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk,
if (strcmp(params->encoding, "pkcs1"))
return -ENOPKG;

tb = kzalloc(sizeof(*tb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tb)
return -ENOMEM;
r = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
if (r)
return r;

/* TODO: Handle a non-all zero SRK authorization */
memset(srkauth, 0, sizeof(srkauth));

r = tpm_loadkey2(tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth,
r = tpm_loadkey2(&tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth,
tk->blob, tk->blob_len, &keyhandle);
if (r < 0) {
pr_devel("loadkey2 failed (%d)\n", r);
Expand All @@ -550,16 +534,16 @@ static int tpm_key_decrypt(struct tpm_key *tk,
/* TODO: Handle a non-all zero key authorization */
memset(keyauth, 0, sizeof(keyauth));

r = tpm_unbind(tb, keyhandle, keyauth,
r = tpm_unbind(&tb, keyhandle, keyauth,
in, params->in_len, out, params->out_len);
if (r < 0)
pr_devel("tpm_unbind failed (%d)\n", r);

if (tpm_flushspecific(tb, keyhandle) < 0)
if (tpm_flushspecific(&tb, keyhandle) < 0)
pr_devel("flushspecific failed (%d)\n", r);

error:
kzfree(tb);
tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, r);
return r;
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -643,7 +627,7 @@ static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk,
struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
const void *in, void *out)
{
struct tpm1_buf *tb;
struct tpm_buf tb;
uint32_t keyhandle;
uint8_t srkauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint8_t keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -681,15 +665,14 @@ static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk,
goto error_free_asn1_wrapped;
}

r = -ENOMEM;
tb = kzalloc(sizeof(*tb), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tb)
r = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0);
if (r)
goto error_free_asn1_wrapped;

/* TODO: Handle a non-all zero SRK authorization */
memset(srkauth, 0, sizeof(srkauth));

r = tpm_loadkey2(tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth,
r = tpm_loadkey2(&tb, SRKHANDLE, srkauth,
tk->blob, tk->blob_len, &keyhandle);
if (r < 0) {
pr_devel("loadkey2 failed (%d)\n", r);
Expand All @@ -699,15 +682,15 @@ static int tpm_key_sign(struct tpm_key *tk,
/* TODO: Handle a non-all zero key authorization */
memset(keyauth, 0, sizeof(keyauth));

r = tpm_sign(tb, keyhandle, keyauth, in, in_len, out, params->out_len);
r = tpm_sign(&tb, keyhandle, keyauth, in, in_len, out, params->out_len);
if (r < 0)
pr_devel("tpm_sign failed (%d)\n", r);

if (tpm_flushspecific(tb, keyhandle) < 0)
if (tpm_flushspecific(&tb, keyhandle) < 0)
pr_devel("flushspecific failed (%d)\n", r);

error_free_tb:
kzfree(tb);
tpm_buf_destroy(&tb);
error_free_asn1_wrapped:
kfree(asn1_wrapped);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, r);
Expand Down
37 changes: 1 addition & 36 deletions include/keys/trusted.h
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -5,10 +5,6 @@
/* implementation specific TPM constants */
#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024
#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87
#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104
#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
Expand All @@ -17,13 +13,6 @@
#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))

struct tpm1_buf {
int len;
unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE];
};

#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)

struct osapsess {
uint32_t handle;
unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
Expand All @@ -46,7 +35,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
unsigned int keylen, ...);

int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen);
int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce);
int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce);

#define TPM_DEBUG 0

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -109,28 +98,4 @@ static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
{
}
#endif

static inline void store8(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char value)
{
buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
}

static inline void store16(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint16_t value)
{
*(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
buf->len += sizeof value;
}

static inline void store32(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint32_t value)
{
*(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
buf->len += sizeof value;
}

static inline void storebytes(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in,
const int len)
{
memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
buf->len += len;
}
#endif
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