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arm64: add credited/trusted RNG support
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Currently arm64 doesn't initialize the primary CRNG in a (potentially)
trusted manner as we only detect the presence of the RNG once secondary
CPUs are up.

Now that the core RNG code distinguishes the early initialization of the
primary CRNG, we can implement arch_get_random_seed_long_early() to
support this.

This patch does so.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Mark Rutland authored and Theodore Ts'o committed Feb 28, 2020
1 parent 253d319 commit ead5084
Showing 1 changed file with 14 additions and 0 deletions.
14 changes: 14 additions & 0 deletions arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@

#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM

#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -66,6 +68,18 @@ static inline bool __init __early_cpu_has_rndr(void)
return (ftr >> ID_AA64ISAR0_RNDR_SHIFT) & 0xf;
}

static inline bool __init __must_check
arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v)
{
WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);

if (!__early_cpu_has_rndr())
return false;

return __arm64_rndr(v);
}
#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early

#else

static inline bool __arm64_rndr(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
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