---

yaml --- r: 311733 b: refs/heads/master c: 8c84bf4 h: refs/heads/master i: 311731: f2662fd v: v3
git-mirror · Jul 8, 2012 · 1618255 · 1618255
1 parent 3d480b0
commit 1618255
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Showing 5 changed files with 14 additions and 5 deletions.
diff --git a/[refs] b/[refs]
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ---
-refs/heads/master: 5db9a4d99b0157a513944e9a44d29c9cec2e91dc
+refs/heads/master: 8c84bf4166a4698296342841a549bbee03860ac0
diff --git a/trunk/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt b/trunk/Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ bits will no longer change the uid or gid; file capabilities will not
 add to the permitted set, and LSMs will not relax constraints after
 execve.
 
+To set no_new_privs, use prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0).
+
+Be careful, though: LSMs might also not tighten constraints on exec
+in no_new_privs mode.  (This means that setting up a general-purpose
+service launcher to set no_new_privs before execing daemons may
+interfere with LSM-based sandboxing.)
+
 Note that no_new_privs does not prevent privilege changes that do not
 involve execve.  An appropriately privileged task can still call
 setuid(2) and receive SCM_RIGHTS datagrams.

diff --git a/trunk/Makefile b/trunk/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 VERSION = 3
 PATCHLEVEL = 5
 SUBLEVEL = 0
-EXTRAVERSION = -rc5
+EXTRAVERSION = -rc6
 NAME = Saber-toothed Squirrel
 
 # *DOCUMENTATION*

diff --git a/trunk/fs/open.c b/trunk/fs/open.c
@@ -397,10 +397,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 {
 	struct file *file;
 	struct inode *inode;
-	int error;
+	int error, fput_needed;
 
 	error = -EBADF;
-	file = fget(fd);
+	file = fget_raw_light(fd, &fput_needed);
 	if (!file)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path);
 out_putf:
-	fput(file);
+	fput_light(file, fput_needed);
 out:
 	return error;
 }

diff --git a/trunk/include/linux/prctl.h b/trunk/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@
  * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege.  So, for example,
  * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
  * in execve returning -EPERM.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
  */
 #define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	38
 #define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS	39