Where is the update script? #2

pmenzel · 2022-03-24T17:18:15Z

I’d like to get the latest stable releases into this archive. What script do I need to execute?

donald · 2022-03-24T17:46:05Z

~buczek/kernel-build/daily.sh is the daily cronjob. It evolves the branches, which were started manually (5.10 and 5.17 currently). If you sit in a clone of this repository you can try ~buczek/kernel-build/update.sh NEW-VERSION OLD-VERSION e.g. ~buczek/kernel-build/update.sh 5.16.17 5.10. NEW_VERSION should include OLD-VERSION, so don't, for example, use 5.10.108 here as old version.

pmenzel · 2022-03-24T17:52:33Z

Found my error: ~/buczek vs ~buczek. :(

donald · 2022-03-24T18:06:08Z

ln -s ~buczek ~/buczek to avoid that in the future :-)

The copy test uses the memcpy() to copy data between IO memory spaces. This can trigger an alignment fault error (pasted the error logs below) because memcpy() may use unaligned accesses on a mapped memory that is just IO, which does not support unaligned memory accesses. Fix it by using the correct memcpy API to copy from/to IO memory. Alignment fault error logs: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000101cd3c1 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000021 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x21: alignment fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021 CM = 0, WnR = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081773000 [ffff8000101cd3c1] pgd=1000000082410003, p4d=1000000082410003, pud=1000000082411003, pmd=1000000082412003, pte=0068004000001f13 Internal error: Oops: 96000021 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6 Comm: kworker/0:0H Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-next-20210914-dirty #2 Hardware name: LS1012A RDB Board (DT) Workqueue: kpcitest pci_epf_test_cmd_handler pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __memcpy+0x168/0x230 lr : pci_epf_test_cmd_handler+0x6f0/0xa68 sp : ffff80001003bce0 x29: ffff80001003bce0 x28: ffff800010135000 x27: ffff8000101e5000 x26: ffff8000101cd000 x25: ffff6cda941cf6c8 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff6cda863f2000 x22: ffff6cda9096c800 x21: ffff800010135000 x20: ffff6cda941cf680 x19: ffffaf39fd999000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffaf39fd2b6000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 15f5c8fa2f984d57 x12: 604d132b60275454 x11: 065cee5e5fb428b6 x10: aae662eb17d0cf3e x9 : 1d97c9a1b4ddef37 x8 : 7541b65edebf928c x7 : e71937c4fc595de0 x6 : b8a0e09562430d1c x5 : ffff8000101e5401 x4 : ffff8000101cd401 x3 : ffff8000101e5380 x2 : fffffffffffffff1 x1 : ffff8000101cd3c0 x0 : ffff8000101e5000 Call trace: __memcpy+0x168/0x230 process_one_work+0x1ec/0x370 worker_thread+0x44/0x478 kthread+0x154/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: a984346c a9c4342c f1010042 54fffee8 (a97c3c8e) ---[ end trace 568c28c7b6336335 ]--- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211217094708.28678-1-Zhiqiang.Hou@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Hou Zhiqiang <Zhiqiang.Hou@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com>

In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function for the host_bridge. If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister() then phb will be freed out from under us. This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison enabled it can lead to a crash: PID: 7574 TASK: c0000000d492cb80 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "drmgr" #0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc #1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608 #2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4 #3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8 #4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30 Data SLB Access [380] exception frame: R0: c000000000167250 R1: c0000000e4f07a00 R2: c000000002a46100 R3: c000000002b39ce8 R4: 00000000000000c0 R5: 00000000000000a9 R6: 3894674d000000c0 R7: 0000000000000000 R8: 00000000000000ff R9: 0000000000000100 R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b R11: 0000000000008000 R12: c00000000023da80 R13: c0000009ffd38b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000011c87f0f0 R16: 0000000000000006 R17: 0000000000000003 R18: 0000000000000002 R19: 0000000000000004 R20: 0000000000000005 R21: 000000011c87ede8 R22: 000000011c87c5a8 R23: 000000011c87d3a0 R24: 0000000000000000 R25: 0000000000000001 R26: c0000000e4f07cc8 R27: c00000004d1cc400 R28: c0080000031d00e8 R29: c00000004d23d800 R30: c00000004d1d2400 R31: c00000004d1d2540 NIP: c000000000167258 MSR: 8000000000009033 OR3: c000000000e9f474 CTR: 0000000000000000 LR: c000000000167250 XER: 0000000020040003 CCR: 0000000024088420 MQ: 0000000000000000 DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3 DSISR: c0000000e4f07920 Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2 [NIP : release_resource+56] [LR : release_resource+48] #5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258 (unreliable) #6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648 #7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io] #8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io] #9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c #10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504 #11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868 #12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c #13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624 #14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4 #15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840 #16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168 To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed. Fixes: 2dd9c11 ("powerpc/pseries: use pci_host_bridge.release_fn() to kfree(phb)") Reported-by: David Dai <zdai@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220318034219.1188008-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au

The res is initialized here only if there's no errors so passing it to ttm_resource_fini in the error paths results in a kernel oops. In the error paths, instead of the unitialized res, we have to use to use node->base on which ttm_resource_init was called. Sample affected backtrace: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000d8 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000106ac0000 [00000000000000d8] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: bnep vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vsock snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep > CPU: 0 PID: 1197 Comm: gnome-shell Tainted: G U 5.17.0-rc2-vmwgfx #2 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VBSA/VBSA, BIOS VEFI 12/31/2020 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : ttm_resource_fini+0x5c/0xac [ttm] lr : ttm_range_man_alloc+0x128/0x1e0 [ttm] sp : ffff80000d783510 x29: ffff80000d783510 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff000086514400 x26: 0000000000000300 x25: ffff0000809f9e78 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff80000d783680 x22: ffff000086514400 x21: 00000000ffffffe4 x20: ffff80000d7836a0 x19: ffff0000809f9e00 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000800 x12: ffff0000f2600a00 x11: 000000000000fc96 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff800001295c18 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000300 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff0000f1034e20 x3 : ffff0000f1034600 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000600000 Call trace: ttm_resource_fini+0x5c/0xac [ttm] ttm_range_man_alloc+0x128/0x1e0 [ttm] ttm_resource_alloc+0x58/0x90 [ttm] ttm_bo_mem_space+0xc8/0x3e4 [ttm] ttm_bo_validate+0xb4/0x134 [ttm] vmw_bo_pin_in_start_of_vram+0xbc/0x200 [vmwgfx] vmw_framebuffer_pin+0xc0/0x154 [vmwgfx] vmw_ldu_primary_plane_atomic_update+0x8c/0x6e0 [vmwgfx] drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x11c/0x2e0 drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x60/0xb0 commit_tail+0x1b0/0x210 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x168/0x400 drm_atomic_commit+0x64/0x74 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xdc/0x11c drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1c4/0x780 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xd0/0x1a0 drm_ioctl+0x2c4/0x690 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xe0/0x174 [vmwgfx] vmw_unlocked_ioctl+0x24/0x30 [vmwgfx] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0x100 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x54/0x184 do_el0_svc+0x34/0x9c el0_svc+0x48/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Code: 35000260 f9401a81 52800002 f9403a60 (f9406c23) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zackr@vmware.com> Fixes: de3688e ("drm/ttm: add ttm_resource_fini v2") Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <krastevm@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220318174332.440068-6-zack@kde.org

Make the name of the anon inode fd "[landlock-ruleset]" instead of "landlock-ruleset". This is minor but most anon inode fds already carry square brackets around their name: [eventfd] [eventpoll] [fanotify] [fscontext] [io_uring] [pidfd] [signalfd] [timerfd] [userfaultfd] For the sake of consistency lets do the same for the landlock-ruleset anon inode fd that comes with landlock. We did the same in 1cdc415 ("uapi, fsopen: use square brackets around "fscontext" [ver #2]") for the new mount api. Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211011133704.1704369-1-brauner@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

This driver, like several others, uses a chained IRQ for each GPIO bank, and forwards .irq_set_wake to the GPIO bank's upstream IRQ. As a result, a call to irq_set_irq_wake() needs to lock both the upstream and downstream irq_desc's. Lockdep considers this to be a possible deadlock when the irq_desc's share lockdep classes, which they do by default: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.17.0-rc3-00394-gc849047c2473 #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- init/307 is trying to acquire lock: c2dfe27c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: c3c0ac7c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); lock(&irq_desc_lock_class); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by init/307: #0: c1f29f18 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_reboot+0x90/0x23c #1: c20f7760 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_shutdown+0xf4/0x224 #2: c2e804d8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_shutdown+0x104/0x224 #3: c3c0ac7c (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 307 Comm: init Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-00394-gc849047c2473 #1 Hardware name: Allwinner sun8i Family unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x1680/0x31a0 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x148/0x3dc lock_acquire from _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x6c _raw_spin_lock_irqsave from __irq_get_desc_lock+0x58/0xa0 __irq_get_desc_lock from irq_set_irq_wake+0x2c/0x19c irq_set_irq_wake from irq_set_irq_wake+0x13c/0x19c [tail call from sunxi_pinctrl_irq_set_wake] irq_set_irq_wake from gpio_keys_suspend+0x80/0x1a4 gpio_keys_suspend from gpio_keys_shutdown+0x10/0x2c gpio_keys_shutdown from device_shutdown+0x180/0x224 device_shutdown from __do_sys_reboot+0x134/0x23c __do_sys_reboot from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c However, this can never deadlock because the upstream and downstream IRQs are never the same (nor do they even involve the same irqchip). Silence this erroneous lockdep splat by applying what appears to be the usual fix of moving the GPIO IRQs to separate lockdep classes. Fixes: a59c99d ("pinctrl: sunxi: Forward calls to irq_set_irq_wake") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org> Reviewed-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216040037.22730-1-samuel@sholland.org Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>

The per-channel data is available directly in the driver data struct. So use it without making use of pwm_[gs]et_chip_data(). The relevant change introduced by this patch to lpc18xx_pwm_disable() at the assembler level (for an arm lpc18xx_defconfig build) is: push {r3, r4, r5, lr} mov r4, r0 mov r0, r1 mov r5, r1 bl 0 <pwm_get_chip_data> ldr r3, [r0, #0] changes to ldr r3, [r1, #8] push {r4, lr} add.w r3, r0, r3, lsl #2 ldr r3, [r3, #92] ; 0x5c So this reduces stack usage, has an improved runtime behavior because of better pipeline usage, doesn't branch to an external function and the generated code is a bit smaller occupying less memory. The codesize of lpc18xx_pwm_probe() is reduced by 32 bytes. Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>

Adjust helper function names and comments after mass rename of struct netfs_read_*request to struct netfs_io_*request. Changes ======= ver #2) - Make the changes in the docs also. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164622992433.3564931.6684311087845150271.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164678196111.1200972.5001114956865989528.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164692892567.2099075.13895804222087028813.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3

Pass start and len to the rreq allocator. This should ensure that the fields are set so that ->init_request() can use them. Also add a parameter to indicates the origin of the request. Ceph can use this to tell whether to get caps. Changes ======= ver #3) - Change the author to me as Jeff feels that most of the patch is my changes now. ver #2) - Show the request origin in the netfs_rreq tracepoint. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164622989020.3564931.17517006047854958747.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164678208569.1200972.12153682697842916557.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164692904155.2099075.14717645623034355995.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3

Add a netfs_i_context struct that should be included in the network filesystem's own inode struct wrapper, directly after the VFS's inode struct, e.g.: struct my_inode { struct { /* These must be contiguous */ struct inode vfs_inode; struct netfs_i_context netfs_ctx; }; }; The netfs_i_context struct so far contains a single field for the network filesystem to use - the cache cookie: struct netfs_i_context { ... struct fscache_cookie *cache; }; Three functions are provided to help with this: (1) void netfs_i_context_init(struct inode *inode, const struct netfs_request_ops *ops); Initialise the netfs context and set the operations. (2) struct netfs_i_context *netfs_i_context(struct inode *inode); Find the netfs context from the VFS inode. (3) struct inode *netfs_inode(struct netfs_i_context *ctx); Find the VFS inode from the netfs context. Changes ======= ver #4) - Fix netfs_is_cache_enabled() to check cookie->cache_priv to see if a cache is present[3]. - Fix netfs_skip_folio_read() to zero out all of the page, not just some of it[3]. ver #3) - Split out the bit to move ceph cap-getting on readahead into ceph_init_request()[1]. - Stick in a comment to the netfs inode structs indicating the contiguity requirements[2]. ver #2) - Adjust documentation to match. - Use "#if IS_ENABLED()" in netfs_i_cookie(), not "#ifdef". - Move the cap check from ceph_readahead() to ceph_init_request() to be called from netfslib. - Remove ceph_readahead() and use netfs_readahead() directly instead. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8af0d47f17d89c06bbf602496dd845f2b0bf25b3.camel@kernel.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/beaf4f6a6c2575ed489adb14b257253c868f9a5c.camel@kernel.org/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3536452.1647421585@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164622984545.3564931.15691742939278418580.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164678213320.1200972.16807551936267647470.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164692909854.2099075.9535537286264248057.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/306388.1647595110@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4

Add a function to do the steps needed to begin a read request, allowing this code to be removed from several other functions and consolidated. Changes ======= ver #2) - Move before the unstaticking patch so that some functions can be left static. - Set uninitialised return code in netfs_begin_read()[1][2]. - Fixed a refleak caused by non-removal of a get from netfs_write_begin() when the request submission code got moved to netfs_begin_read(). - Use INIT_WORK() to (re-)init the request work_struct[3]. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303163826.1120936-1-nathan@kernel.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220303235647.1297171-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com/ [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9d69be49081bccff44260e4c6e0049c63d6d04a1.camel@redhat.com/ [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164623004355.3564931.7275693529042495641.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164678214287.1200972.16734134007649832160.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164692911113.2099075.1060868473229451371.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3

Rename netfs_rreq_unlock() to netfs_rreq_unlock_folios() to make it sound less like it's dropping a lock on an netfs_io_request struct. Remove the 'static' marker on netfs_rreq_unlock_folios() and declaring it in internal.h preparatory to splitting the file. Changes ======= ver #2) - Slide this patch to after the one adding netfs_begin_read(). - As a consequence, don't need to unstatic so many functions. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164623002861.3564931.17340149482236413375.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164678215208.1200972.9761906209395002182.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164692912709.2099075.4349905992838317797.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3

Rename the read_helper.c file to io.c before splitting out the buffered read functions and some other bits. Changes ======= ver #2) - Rename read_helper.c before splitting. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164678216109.1200972.16567696909952495832.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164692918076.2099075.8120961172717347610.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3

Split fs/netfs/read_helper.c into two pieces, one to deal with buffered writes and one to deal with the I/O mechanism. Changes ======= ver #2) - Add kdoc reference to new file. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164623005586.3564931.6149556072728481767.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164678217075.1200972.5101072043126828757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164692919953.2099075.7156989585513833046.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3

When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array. This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init() which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them. Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #define die(s) perror(s), exit(1) #define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; if (argc < 2) exit(1); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) die("open"); if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1) die("ioctl"); close(fd); return 0; } mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ... gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0 [ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4 [ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2 [ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs] [ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48 [ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0 [ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800 [ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8 [ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1832.132801] Call Trace: [ 1832.132962] <TASK> [ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs] [ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs] [ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs] [ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs] [ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs] [ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs] [ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs] [ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0 [ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710 [ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0 [ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0 [ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df [ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df [ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e [ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48 [ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000 [ 1832.142851] </TASK> [ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

We've got a mess on our hands. 1. xfs_trans_commit() cannot cancel transactions because the mount is shut down - that causes dirty, aborted, unlogged log items to sit unpinned in memory and potentially get written to disk before the log is shut down. Hence xfs_trans_commit() can only abort transactions when xlog_is_shutdown() is true. 2. xfs_force_shutdown() is used in places to cause the current modification to be aborted via xfs_trans_commit() because it may be impractical or impossible to cancel the transaction directly, and hence xfs_trans_commit() must cancel transactions when xfs_is_shutdown() is true in this situation. But we can't do that because of #1. 3. Log IO errors cause log shutdowns by calling xfs_force_shutdown() to shut down the mount and then the log from log IO completion. 4. xfs_force_shutdown() can result in a log force being issued, which has to wait for log IO completion before it will mark the log as shut down. If #3 races with some other shutdown trigger that runs a log force, we rely on xfs_force_shutdown() silently ignoring #3 and avoiding shutting down the log until the failed log force completes. 5. To ensure #2 always works, we have to ensure that xfs_force_shutdown() does not return until the the log is shut down. But in the case of #4, this will result in a deadlock because the log Io completion will block waiting for a log force to complete which is blocked waiting for log IO to complete.... So the very first thing we have to do here to untangle this mess is dissociate log shutdown triggers from mount shutdowns. We already have xlog_forced_shutdown, which will atomically transistion to the log a shutdown state. Due to internal asserts it cannot be called multiple times, but was done simply because the only place that could call it was xfs_do_force_shutdown() (i.e. the mount shutdown!) and that could only call it once and once only. So the first thing we do is remove the asserts. We then convert all the internal log shutdown triggers to call xlog_force_shutdown() directly instead of xfs_force_shutdown(). This allows the log shutdown triggers to shut down the log without needing to care about mount based shutdown constraints. This means we shut down the log independently of the mount and the mount may not notice this until it's next attempt to read or modify metadata. At that point (e.g. xfs_trans_commit()) it will see that the log is shutdown, error out and shutdown the mount. To ensure that all the unmount behaviours and asserts track correctly as a result of a log shutdown, propagate the shutdown up to the mount if it is not already set. This keeps the mount and log state in sync, and saves a huge amount of hassle where code fails because of a log shutdown but only checks for mount shutdowns and hence ends up doing the wrong thing. Cleaning up that mess is an exercise for another day. This enables us to address the other problems noted above in followup patches. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>

As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds: crash> bt PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8" #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227] RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8 RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200 R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm] #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm] #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm] RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0 R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix this. Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Message-Id: <20220309113025.44469-1-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

…e_zone btrfs_can_activate_zone() can be called with the device_list_mutex already held, which will lead to a deadlock: insert_dev_extents() // Takes device_list_mutex `-> insert_dev_extent() `-> btrfs_insert_empty_item() `-> btrfs_insert_empty_items() `-> btrfs_search_slot() `-> btrfs_cow_block() `-> __btrfs_cow_block() `-> btrfs_alloc_tree_block() `-> btrfs_reserve_extent() `-> find_free_extent() `-> find_free_extent_update_loop() `-> can_allocate_chunk() `-> btrfs_can_activate_zone() // Takes device_list_mutex again Instead of using the RCU on fs_devices->device_list we can use fs_devices->alloc_list, protected by the chunk_mutex to traverse the list of active devices. We are in the chunk allocation thread. The newer chunk allocation happens from the devices in the fs_device->alloc_list protected by the chunk_mutex. btrfs_create_chunk() lockdep_assert_held(&info->chunk_mutex); gather_device_info list_for_each_entry(device, &fs_devices->alloc_list, dev_alloc_list) Also, a device that reappears after the mount won't join the alloc_list yet and, it will be in the dev_list, which we don't want to consider in the context of the chunk alloc. [15.166572] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [15.167117] 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 Not tainted [15.167487] -------------------------------------------- [15.167733] kworker/u8:3/146 is trying to acquire lock: [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.167733] [15.167733] but task is already holding lock: [15.167733] ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs] [15.167733] [15.167733] other info that might help us debug this: [15.167733] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [15.167733] [15.171834] CPU0 [15.171834] ---- [15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [15.171834] lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); [15.171834] [15.171834] *** DEADLOCK *** [15.171834] [15.171834] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [15.171834] [15.171834] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:3/146: [15.171834] #0: ffff888100050938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0 [15.171834] #1: ffffc9000067be80 ((work_completion)(&fs_info->async_data_reclaim_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c3/0x5a0 [15.176244] #2: ffff88810521e620 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: flush_space+0x335/0x600 [btrfs] [15.176244] #3: ffff888102962ee0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x20a/0x560 [btrfs] [15.176244] #4: ffff8881152e4b78 (btrfs-dev-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x27/0x130 [btrfs] [15.179641] [15.179641] stack backtrace: [15.179641] CPU: 1 PID: 146 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-dennis #79 [15.179641] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [15.179641] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs] [15.179641] Call Trace: [15.179641] <TASK> [15.179641] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 [15.179641] __lock_acquire.cold+0x217/0x2b2 [15.179641] lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] __mutex_lock+0x8e/0x970 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130 [15.183838] ? find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] find_free_extent+0x15a/0x14f0 [btrfs] [15.183838] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40 [15.183838] ? btrfs_get_alloc_profile+0x106/0x230 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x131/0x260 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb5/0x3b0 [btrfs] [15.187601] __btrfs_cow_block+0x138/0x600 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_cow_block+0x10f/0x230 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_search_slot+0x55f/0xbc0 [btrfs] [15.187601] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd7/0x130 [15.187601] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x2d/0x60 [btrfs] [15.187601] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x2b3/0x560 [btrfs] [15.187601] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x36/0x2a0 [btrfs] [15.192037] flush_space+0x374/0x600 [btrfs] [15.192037] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [15.192037] ? btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x49/0x180 [btrfs] [15.192037] ? lock_release+0x131/0x2b0 [15.192037] btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x70/0x180 [btrfs] [15.192037] process_one_work+0x24c/0x5a0 [15.192037] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 Fixes: a85f05e ("btrfs: zoned: avoid chunk allocation if active block group has enough space") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.16+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit 4ff2980 ] in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2(). According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2: if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280 if packet is larger than 1280 bytes Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280 Drop packet else Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4 packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer on the encapsulator or by some router along the IPv4 path. endif else if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20) Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20). Drop packet. else Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. endif endif Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it. After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation. No.48 & No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized, then tunneled with IPv4(No.49& No.50), which obey spec. And received peer cannot decrypt it rightly. 48 2002::10 2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) 49 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 1304 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44) 50 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 200 ESP (SPI=0x00035000) 51 2002::10 2002::11 180 Echo (ping) request 52 0x56dc 2002::10 2002::11 248 IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below: 1 0x6206 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2] 2 0x6206 2002::10 2002::11 88 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50) 3 0x0000 2002::10 2002::11 248 ICMPv6 Echo (ping) request Signed-off-by: Lina Wang <lina.wang@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 7e0438f upstream. The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning: 1. Open device /dev/tpmrm. 2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi. 3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4 brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835] CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2 Hardware name: BCM2711 [<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8) [<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108) [<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8) [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4) [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm]) [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm]) [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0) [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc) [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c) Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0) bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684 bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944 ---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]--- The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero. Since commit 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken, because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set. Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2. Commit fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results in the call of this function. Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister(). Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the good case and error cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") Fixes: 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c51abd9 upstream. In many cases, keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() is validating the user buffer lengths against the wrong algorithm properties. Fix it to check against the correct properties. Probably this wasn't noticed before because for all asymmetric keys of the "public_key" subtype, max_data_size == max_sig_size == max_enc_size == max_dec_size. However, this isn't necessarily true for the "asym_tpm" subtype (it should be, but it's not strictly validated). Of course, future key types could have different values as well. Fixes: 00d60fd ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit d6f5e35 upstream. When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array. This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init() which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them. Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #define die(s) perror(s), exit(1) #define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; if (argc < 2) exit(1); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) die("open"); if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1) die("ioctl"); close(fd); return 0; } mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ... gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0 [ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4 [ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2 [ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs] [ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48 [ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0 [ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800 [ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8 [ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1832.132801] Call Trace: [ 1832.132962] <TASK> [ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs] [ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs] [ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs] [ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs] [ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs] [ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs] [ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs] [ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0 [ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710 [ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0 [ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0 [ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df [ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df [ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e [ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48 [ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000 [ 1832.142851] </TASK> [ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 3886a86 upstream. A missing bounds check in vm_access() can lead to an out-of-bounds read or write in the adjacent memory area, since the len attribute is not validated before the memcpy later in the function, potentially hitting: [ 183.637831] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000c86000 [ 183.637934] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 183.637997] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 183.638059] PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 100258067 PMD 106341067 PTE 0 [ 183.638144] Oops: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 183.638201] CPU: 3 PID: 1790 Comm: poc Tainted: G D 5.17.0-rc6-ci-drm-11296+ #1 [ 183.638298] Hardware name: Intel Corporation CoffeeLake Client Platform/CoffeeLake H DDR4 RVP, BIOS CNLSFWR1.R00.X208.B00.1905301319 05/30/2019 [ 183.638430] RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10 [ 183.640213] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001763d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 183.641117] RAX: ffff888109c14000 RBX: ffff888111bece40 RCX: 0000000000000ffc [ 183.642029] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffc90000c86000 RDI: ffff888109c14004 [ 183.642946] RBP: 0000000000000ffc R08: 800000000000016b R09: 0000000000000000 [ 183.643848] R10: ffffc90000c85000 R11: 0000000000000048 R12: 0000000000001000 [ 183.644742] R13: ffff888111bed190 R14: ffff888109c14000 R15: 0000000000001000 [ 183.645653] FS: 00007fe5ef807540(0000) GS:ffff88845b380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 183.646570] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 183.647481] CR2: ffffc90000c86000 CR3: 000000010ff02006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 183.648384] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 183.649271] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 183.650142] Call Trace: [ 183.650988] <TASK> [ 183.651793] vm_access+0x1f0/0x2a0 [i915] [ 183.652726] __access_remote_vm+0x224/0x380 [ 183.653561] mem_rw.isra.0+0xf9/0x190 [ 183.654402] vfs_read+0x9d/0x1b0 [ 183.655238] ksys_read+0x63/0xe0 [ 183.656065] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0 [ 183.656882] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 183.657663] RIP: 0033:0x7fe5ef725142 [ 183.659351] RSP: 002b:00007ffe1e81c7e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 183.660227] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557055dfb780 RCX: 00007fe5ef725142 [ 183.661104] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffe1e81d880 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 183.661972] RBP: 00007ffe1e81e890 R08: 0000000000000030 R09: 0000000000000046 [ 183.662832] R10: 0000557055dfc2e0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000557055dfb1c0 [ 183.663691] R13: 00007ffe1e81e980 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Changes since v1: - Updated if condition with range_overflows_t [Chris Wilson] Fixes: 9f909e2 ("drm/i915: Implement vm_ops->access for gdb access into mmaps") Signed-off-by: Mastan Katragadda <mastanx.katragadda@intel.com> Suggested-by: Adam Zabrocki <adamza@microsoft.com> Reported-by: Jackson Cody <cody.jackson@intel.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Cc: Sudeep Dutt <sudeep.dutt@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.8+ Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> [mauld: tidy up the commit message and add Cc: stable] Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220303060428.1668844-1-mastanx.katragadda@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 661412e) Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 841aee4 ] Put NVMe/TCP sockets in their own class to avoid some lockdep warnings. Sockets created by nvme-tcp are not exposed to user-space, and will not trigger certain code paths that the general socket API exposes. Lockdep complains about a circular dependency between the socket and filesystem locks, because setsockopt can trigger a page fault with a socket lock held, but nvme-tcp sends requests on the socket while file system locks are held. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.0-rc3 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ fio/1496 is trying to acquire lock: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendpage+0x23/0x80 but task is already holding lock: (&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xfs_ilock+0xcf/0x290 [xfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. other info that might help us debug this: chain exists of: sk_lock-AF_INET --> sb_internal --> &xfs_dir_ilock_class/5 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5); lock(sb_internal); lock(&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5); lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by fio/1496: #0: (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: path_openat+0x9fc/0xa20 #1: (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key){++++}-{3:3}, at: path_openat+0x296/0xa20 #2: (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: xfs_trans_alloc_icreate+0x41/0xd0 [xfs] #3: (&xfs_dir_ilock_class/5){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xfs_ilock+0xcf/0x290 [xfs] #4: (hctx->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: hctx_lock+0x51/0xd0 #5: (&queue->send_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0x33e/0x380 [nvme_tcp] This annotation lets lockdep analyze nvme-tcp controlled sockets independently of what the user-space sockets API does. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/CAHj4cs9MDYLJ+q+2_GXUK9HxFizv2pxUryUR0toX974M040z7g@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit a80ced6 upstream. As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds: crash> bt PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8" #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227] RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8 RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200 R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm] #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm] #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm] RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0 R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix this. Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Message-Id: <20220309113025.44469-1-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 7e0438f upstream. The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning: 1. Open device /dev/tpmrm. 2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi. 3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4 brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835] CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2 Hardware name: BCM2711 [<c0410c3c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c040b580>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c040b580>] (show_stack) from [<c1092174>] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8) [<c1092174>] (dump_stack) from [<c0445a30>] (__warn+0x104/0x108) [<c0445a30>] (__warn) from [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8) [<c0445aa8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4) [<c08435d0>] (kobject_get) from [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm]) [<bf0a715c>] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm]) [<bf0a7d6c>] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0) [<c05a7ac0>] (vfs_write) from [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc) [<c05a7ee4>] (ksys_write) from [<c04001a0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c) Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0) bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684 bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944 ---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]--- The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero. Since commit 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken, because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set. Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2. Commit fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results in the call of this function. Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister(). Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the good case and error cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fdc915f ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm<n>") Fixes: 8979b02 ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c51abd9 upstream. In many cases, keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() is validating the user buffer lengths against the wrong algorithm properties. Fix it to check against the correct properties. Probably this wasn't noticed before because for all asymmetric keys of the "public_key" subtype, max_data_size == max_sig_size == max_enc_size == max_dec_size. However, this isn't necessarily true for the "asym_tpm" subtype (it should be, but it's not strictly validated). Of course, future key types could have different values as well. Fixes: 00d60fd ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The commit ced17ee ("Revert "virtio: reject shm region if length is zero"") exposes the following DAX page fault bug (this fix the failure that getting shm region alway returns false because of zero length): The commit 21aa65b ("mm: remove callers of pfn_t functionality") handles the DAX physical page address incorrectly: the removed macro 'phys_to_pfn_t()' should be replaced with 'PHYS_PFN()'. [ 1.390321] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd3fb40000008 [ 1.390875] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 1.391257] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 1.391509] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 1.391626] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 1.391806] CPU: 6 UID: 1000 PID: 162 Comm: weston Not tainted 6.17.0-rc3-WSL2-STABLE #2 PREEMPT(none) [ 1.392361] RIP: 0010:dax_to_folio+0x14/0x60 [ 1.392653] Code: 52 c9 c3 00 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c1 ef 05 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d 34 b5 31 01 <48> 8b 57 08 48 89 f8 f6 c2 01 75 2b 66 90 c3 cc cc cc cc f7 c7 ff [ 1.393727] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7d04407aa8 EFLAGS: 00010086 [ 1.394003] RAX: 000000a000000000 RBX: ffffaf7d04407bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1.394524] RDX: ffffd17b40000008 RSI: 0000000000000083 RDI: ffffd3fb40000000 [ 1.394967] RBP: 0000000000000011 R08: 000000a000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1.395400] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: ffffaf7d04407c10 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1.395806] R13: ffffa020557be9c0 R14: 0000014000000001 R15: 0000725970e94000 [ 1.396268] FS: 000072596d6d2ec0(0000) GS:ffffa0222dc59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1.396715] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1.397100] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 CR3: 000000011579c005 CR4: 0000000000372ef0 [ 1.397518] Call Trace: [ 1.397663] <TASK> [ 1.397900] dax_insert_entry+0x13b/0x390 [ 1.398179] dax_fault_iter+0x2a5/0x6c0 [ 1.398443] dax_iomap_pte_fault+0x193/0x3c0 [ 1.398750] __fuse_dax_fault+0x8b/0x270 [ 1.398997] ? vm_mmap_pgoff+0x161/0x210 [ 1.399175] __do_fault+0x30/0x180 [ 1.399360] do_fault+0xc4/0x550 [ 1.399547] __handle_mm_fault+0x8e3/0xf50 [ 1.399731] ? do_syscall_64+0x72/0x1e0 [ 1.399958] handle_mm_fault+0x192/0x2f0 [ 1.400204] do_user_addr_fault+0x20e/0x700 [ 1.400418] exc_page_fault+0x66/0x150 [ 1.400602] asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [ 1.400831] RIP: 0033:0x72596d1bf703 [ 1.401076] Code: 31 f6 45 31 e4 48 8d 15 b3 73 00 00 e8 06 03 00 00 8b 83 68 01 00 00 e9 8e fa ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 8b 44 24 08 4c 89 ee 48 89 df <c7> 00 21 43 34 12 e8 72 09 00 00 e9 6a fa ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 [ 1.402172] RSP: 002b:00007ffc350f6dc0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 1.402488] RAX: 0000725970e94000 RBX: 00005b7c642c2560 RCX: 0000725970d359a7 [ 1.402898] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc350f6dc0 RDI: 00005b7c642c2560 [ 1.403284] RBP: 00007ffc350f6e90 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1.403634] R10: 00007ffc350f6dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 1.404078] R13: 00007ffc350f6dc0 R14: 0000725970e29ce0 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 1.404450] </TASK> [ 1.404570] Modules linked in: [ 1.404821] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 [ 1.405029] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 1.405323] RIP: 0010:dax_to_folio+0x14/0x60 [ 1.405556] Code: 52 c9 c3 00 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c1 ef 05 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d 34 b5 31 01 <48> 8b 57 08 48 89 f8 f6 c2 01 75 2b 66 90 c3 cc cc cc cc f7 c7 ff [ 1.406639] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7d04407aa8 EFLAGS: 00010086 [ 1.406910] RAX: 000000a000000000 RBX: ffffaf7d04407bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1.407379] RDX: ffffd17b40000008 RSI: 0000000000000083 RDI: ffffd3fb40000000 [ 1.407800] RBP: 0000000000000011 R08: 000000a000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1.408246] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: ffffaf7d04407c10 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1.408666] R13: ffffa020557be9c0 R14: 0000014000000001 R15: 0000725970e94000 [ 1.409170] FS: 000072596d6d2ec0(0000) GS:ffffa0222dc59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1.409608] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1.409977] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 CR3: 000000011579c005 CR4: 0000000000372ef0 [ 1.410437] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 1.410857] Kernel Offset: 0xc000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Fixes: 21aa65b ("mm: remove callers of pfn_t functionality") Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyuewa@163.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250904120339.972-1-haiyuewa@163.com Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 9b2bfdb ] When transmitting a PTP frame which is timestamp using 2 step, the following warning appears if CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 Not tainted ----------------------------- ptp4l/119 is trying to lock: c2a44ed4 (&vsc8531->ts_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 4 locks held by ptp4l/119: #0: c145f068 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x58/0x1440 #1: c29df974 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x5c4/0x1440 #2: c2aaaad0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x350 #3: c2aac170 (&lan966x->tx_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: lan966x_port_xmit+0xd0/0x350 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 NONE Hardware name: Generic DT based system Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x8e8/0x29dc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x108/0x38c lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xb0/0xe78 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac vsc85xx_txtstamp from lan966x_fdma_xmit+0xd8/0x3a8 lan966x_fdma_xmit from lan966x_port_xmit+0x1bc/0x350 lan966x_port_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc8/0x2c0 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x350 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x680/0x1440 __dev_queue_xmit from packet_sendmsg+0xfa4/0x1568 packet_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0x110/0x19c __sys_sendto from sys_send+0x18/0x20 sys_send from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf0b05fa8 to 0xf0b05ff0) 5fa0: 00000001 0000000e 0000000e 0004b47a 0000003a 00000000 5fc0: 00000001 0000000e 00000000 00000121 0004af58 00044874 00000000 00000000 5fe0: 00000001 bee9d420 00025a10 b6e75c7c So, instead of using the ts_lock for tx_queue, use the spinlock that skb_buff_head has. Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev> Fixes: 7d272e6 ("net: phy: mscc: timestamping and PHC support") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250902121259.3257536-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1f5d2fd ] When the "proxy" option is enabled on a VXLAN device, the device will suppress ARP requests and IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages if it is able to reply on behalf of the remote host. That is, if a matching and valid neighbor entry is configured on the VXLAN device whose MAC address is not behind the "any" remote (0.0.0.0 / ::). The code currently assumes that the FDB entry for the neighbor's MAC address points to a valid remote destination, but this is incorrect if the entry is associated with an FDB nexthop group. This can result in a NPD [1][3] which can be reproduced using [2][4]. Fix by checking that the remote destination exists before dereferencing it. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: arping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme-g2a89cb21162c #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0xb58/0x15f0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [2] #!/bin/bash ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 192.0.2.3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 arping -b -c 1 -s 192.0.2.1 -I vx0 192.0.2.3 [3] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 372 Comm: ndisc6 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtmne-g6ee90cb26014 #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1v996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2x014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0x803/0x1600 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 ip6_finish_output2+0x210/0x6c0 ip6_finish_output+0x1af/0x2b0 ip6_mr_output+0x92/0x3e0 ip6_send_skb+0x30/0x90 rawv6_sendmsg+0xe6e/0x12e0 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f383422ec77 [4] #!/bin/bash ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/128 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 2001:db8:1::1 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 2001:db8:1::1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 ndisc6 -r 1 -s 2001:db8:1::1 -w 1 2001:db8:1::3 vx0 Fixes: 1274e1c ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries") Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-3-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 9b2bfdb ] When transmitting a PTP frame which is timestamp using 2 step, the following warning appears if CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 Not tainted ----------------------------- ptp4l/119 is trying to lock: c2a44ed4 (&vsc8531->ts_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 4 locks held by ptp4l/119: #0: c145f068 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x58/0x1440 #1: c29df974 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x5c4/0x1440 #2: c2aaaad0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x350 #3: c2aac170 (&lan966x->tx_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: lan966x_port_xmit+0xd0/0x350 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 NONE Hardware name: Generic DT based system Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x8e8/0x29dc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x108/0x38c lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xb0/0xe78 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac vsc85xx_txtstamp from lan966x_fdma_xmit+0xd8/0x3a8 lan966x_fdma_xmit from lan966x_port_xmit+0x1bc/0x350 lan966x_port_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc8/0x2c0 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x350 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x680/0x1440 __dev_queue_xmit from packet_sendmsg+0xfa4/0x1568 packet_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0x110/0x19c __sys_sendto from sys_send+0x18/0x20 sys_send from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf0b05fa8 to 0xf0b05ff0) 5fa0: 00000001 0000000e 0000000e 0004b47a 0000003a 00000000 5fc0: 00000001 0000000e 00000000 00000121 0004af58 00044874 00000000 00000000 5fe0: 00000001 bee9d420 00025a10 b6e75c7c So, instead of using the ts_lock for tx_queue, use the spinlock that skb_buff_head has. Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev> Fixes: 7d272e6 ("net: phy: mscc: timestamping and PHC support") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250902121259.3257536-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1f5d2fd ] When the "proxy" option is enabled on a VXLAN device, the device will suppress ARP requests and IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages if it is able to reply on behalf of the remote host. That is, if a matching and valid neighbor entry is configured on the VXLAN device whose MAC address is not behind the "any" remote (0.0.0.0 / ::). The code currently assumes that the FDB entry for the neighbor's MAC address points to a valid remote destination, but this is incorrect if the entry is associated with an FDB nexthop group. This can result in a NPD [1][3] which can be reproduced using [2][4]. Fix by checking that the remote destination exists before dereferencing it. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: arping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme-g2a89cb21162c #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0xb58/0x15f0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [2] #!/bin/bash ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 192.0.2.3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 arping -b -c 1 -s 192.0.2.1 -I vx0 192.0.2.3 [3] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 372 Comm: ndisc6 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtmne-g6ee90cb26014 #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1v996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2x014 RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0x803/0x1600 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0 ip6_finish_output2+0x210/0x6c0 ip6_finish_output+0x1af/0x2b0 ip6_mr_output+0x92/0x3e0 ip6_send_skb+0x30/0x90 rawv6_sendmsg+0xe6e/0x12e0 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f383422ec77 [4] #!/bin/bash ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/128 dev lo ip nexthop add id 1 via 2001:db8:1::1 fdb ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 2001:db8:1::1 dstport 4789 proxy ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10 ndisc6 -r 1 -s 2001:db8:1::1 -w 1 2001:db8:1::3 vx0 Fixes: 1274e1c ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries") Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-3-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 9b2bfdb ] When transmitting a PTP frame which is timestamp using 2 step, the following warning appears if CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 Not tainted ----------------------------- ptp4l/119 is trying to lock: c2a44ed4 (&vsc8531->ts_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 4 locks held by ptp4l/119: #0: c145f068 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x58/0x1440 #1: c29df974 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x5c4/0x1440 #2: c2aaaad0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x350 #3: c2aac170 (&lan966x->tx_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: lan966x_port_xmit+0xd0/0x350 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e #427 NONE Hardware name: Generic DT based system Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x8e8/0x29dc __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x108/0x38c lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xb0/0xe78 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac vsc85xx_txtstamp from lan966x_fdma_xmit+0xd8/0x3a8 lan966x_fdma_xmit from lan966x_port_xmit+0x1bc/0x350 lan966x_port_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc8/0x2c0 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x350 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x680/0x1440 __dev_queue_xmit from packet_sendmsg+0xfa4/0x1568 packet_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0x110/0x19c __sys_sendto from sys_send+0x18/0x20 sys_send from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf0b05fa8 to 0xf0b05ff0) 5fa0: 00000001 0000000e 0000000e 0004b47a 0000003a 00000000 5fc0: 00000001 0000000e 00000000 00000121 0004af58 00044874 00000000 00000000 5fe0: 00000001 bee9d420 00025a10 b6e75c7c So, instead of using the ts_lock for tx_queue, use the spinlock that skb_buff_head has. Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev> Fixes: 7d272e6 ("net: phy: mscc: timestamping and PHC support") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250902121259.3257536-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Problem description =================== Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between &pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows. phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex -> phylink_major_config() -> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else, &pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy(). The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method, invoked by the PHY state machine. phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired. Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config. So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be consistent with this order. Problem impact ============== I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call, is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep. Proposed solution ================= Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before &pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place. Solution details, considerations, notes ======================================= This is the phy_config_inband() call graph: sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_config_phy() | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert() | | | v | phylink_sfp_module_insert() | | | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start() | | | | | v | | phylink_sfp_module_start() | | | | v v | phylink_sfp_config_optical() phylink_start() | | | phylink_resume() v v | | phylink_sfp_set_config() | | | v v v phylink_mac_initial_config() | phylink_resolve() | | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set() v v v phylink_major_config() | v phy_config_inband() phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire &pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config(). phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires &pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock. phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is completely uninteresting, because it only calls phylink_major_config() if pl->phydev is NULL (otherwise it calls phy_ethtool_ksettings_set()). We need to change nothing there. Other solutions =============== The lock inversion between &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock has occurred at least once before, as seen in commit c718af2 ("net: phylink: fix ethtool -A with attached PHYs"). The solution there was to simply not call phy_set_asym_pause() under the &pl->state_mutex. That cannot be extended to our case though, where the phy_config_inband() call is much deeper inside the &pl->state_mutex section. Fixes: 5fd0f1a ("net: phylink: add negotiation of in-band capabilities") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250904125238.193990-2-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") simplified code by using the for_each_of_range() iterator, but it broke PCI enumeration on Turris Omnia (and probably other mvebu targets). Issue #1: To determine range.flags, of_pci_range_parser_one() uses bus->get_flags(), which resolves to of_bus_pci_get_flags(), which already returns an IORESOURCE bit field, and NOT the original flags from the "ranges" resource. Then mvebu_get_tgt_attr() attempts the very same conversion again. Remove the misinterpretation of range.flags in mvebu_get_tgt_attr(), to restore the intended behavior. Issue #2: The driver needs target and attributes, which are encoded in the raw address values of the "/soc/pcie/ranges" resource. According to of_pci_range_parser_one(), the raw values are stored in range.bus_addr and range.parent_bus_addr, respectively. range.cpu_addr is a translated version of range.parent_bus_addr, and not relevant here. Use the correct range structure member, to extract target and attributes. This restores the intended behavior. Fixes: 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") Reported-by: Jan Palus <jpalus@fastmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220479 Signed-off-by: Klaus Kudielka <klaus.kudielka@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Tested-by: Tony Dinh <mibodhi@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jan Palus <jpalus@fastmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250907102303.29735-1-klaus.kudielka@gmail.com

…ostcopy When you run a KVM guest with vhost-net and migrate that guest to another host, and you immediately enable postcopy after starting the migration, there is a big chance that the network connection of the guest won't work anymore on the destination side after the migration. With a debug kernel v6.16.0, there is also a call trace that looks like this: FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 881 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 549 Comm: kworker/6:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0 #56 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 LA1 400 (LPAR) Workqueue: events irqfd_inject [kvm] Call Trace: [<00003173cbecc634>] dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x168 [<00003173cca69588>] handle_userfault+0xde8/0x1310 [<00003173cc756f0c>] handle_pte_fault+0x4fc/0x760 [<00003173cc759212>] __handle_mm_fault+0x452/0xa00 [<00003173cc7599ba>] handle_mm_fault+0x1fa/0x6a0 [<00003173cc73409a>] __get_user_pages+0x4aa/0xba0 [<00003173cc7349e8>] get_user_pages_remote+0x258/0x770 [<000031734be6f052>] get_map_page+0xe2/0x190 [kvm] [<000031734be6f910>] adapter_indicators_set+0x50/0x4a0 [kvm] [<000031734be7f674>] set_adapter_int+0xc4/0x170 [kvm] [<000031734be2f268>] kvm_set_irq+0x228/0x3f0 [kvm] [<000031734be27000>] irqfd_inject+0xd0/0x150 [kvm] [<00003173cc00c9ec>] process_one_work+0x87c/0x1490 [<00003173cc00dda6>] worker_thread+0x7a6/0x1010 [<00003173cc02dc36>] kthread+0x3b6/0x710 [<00003173cbed2f0c>] __ret_from_fork+0xdc/0x7f0 [<00003173cdd737ca>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/549: #0: 00000000800bc958 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7ee/0x1490 #1: 000030f3d527fbd0 ((work_completion)(&irqfd->inject)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x81c/0x1490 #2: 00000000f99862b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: get_map_page+0xa8/0x190 [kvm] The "FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing" indicates that handle_userfaultfd() saw a page fault request without ALLOW_RETRY flag set, hence userfaultfd cannot remotely resolve it (because the caller was asking for an immediate resolution, aka, FAULT_FLAG_NOWAIT, while remote faults can take time). With that, get_map_page() failed and the irq was lost. We should not be strictly in an atomic environment here and the worker should be sleepable (the call is done during an ioctl from userspace), so we can allow adapter_indicators_set() to just sleep waiting for the remote fault instead. Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-42486 Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> [thuth: Assembled patch description and fixed some cosmetical issues] Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: f654706 ("KVM: s390/interrupt: do not pin adapter interrupt pages") [frankja: Added fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>

syzkaller has caught us red-handed once more, this time nesting regular spinlocks behind raw spinlocks: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- syz.0.29/3743 is trying to lock: a3ff80008e2e9e18 (&xa->xa_lock#20){....}-{3:3}, at: vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by syz.0.29/3743: #0: a3ff80008e2e90a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x50/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:499 #1: a3ff80008e2e9fa0 (&kvm->arch.config_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x5c/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:500 #2: 58f0000021be1428 (&vgic_cpu->ap_list_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x3c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:150 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3743 Comm: syz.0.29 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C) __dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120 dump_stack+0x1c/0x28 lib/dump_stack.c:129 print_lock_invalid_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4833 [inline] check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4905 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x978/0x299c kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5190 lock_acquire+0x14c/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x7c kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137 vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x24c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:158 __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy+0x44/0x500 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:455 kvm_vgic_destroy+0x100/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:505 kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x80/0x138 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:244 kvm_destroy_vm virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1308 [inline] kvm_put_kvm+0x800/0xff8 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1344 kvm_vm_release+0x58/0x78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1367 __fput+0x4ac/0x980 fs/file_table.c:465 ____fput+0x20/0x58 fs/file_table.c:493 task_work_run+0x1bc/0x254 kernel/task_work.c:227 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] do_notify_resume+0x1b4/0x270 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:151 exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline] exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline] el0_svc+0xb4/0x160 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:768 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 This is of course no good, but is at odds with how LPI refcounts are managed. Solve the locking mess by deferring the release of unreferenced LPIs after the ap_list_lock is released. Mark these to-be-released LPIs specially to avoid racing with vgic_put_irq() and causing a double-free. Since references can only be taken on LPIs with a nonzero refcount, extending the lifetime of freed LPIs is still safe. Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+cef594105ac7e60c6d93@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/68acd0d9.a00a0220.33401d.048b.GAE@google.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250905100531.282980-5-oliver.upton@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit e2a10da ] Problem description =================== Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between &pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows. phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex -> phylink_major_config() -> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else, &pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy(). The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method, invoked by the PHY state machine. phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired. Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config. So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be consistent with this order. Problem impact ============== I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call, is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep. Proposed solution ================= Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before &pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place. Solution details, considerations, notes ======================================= This is the phy_config_inband() call graph: sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_config_phy() | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert() | | | v | phylink_sfp_module_insert() | | | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start() | | | | | v | | phylink_sfp_module_start() | | | | v v | phylink_sfp_config_optical() phylink_start() | | | phylink_resume() v v | | phylink_sfp_set_config() | | | v v v phylink_mac_initial_config() | phylink_resolve() | | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set() v v v phylink_major_config() | v phy_config_inband() phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire &pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config(). phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires &pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock. phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is completely uninteresting, because it only calls phylink_major_config() if pl->phydev is NULL (otherwise it calls phy_ethtool_ksettings_set()). We need to change nothing there. Other solutions =============== The lock inversion between &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock has occurred at least once before, as seen in commit c718af2 ("net: phylink: fix ethtool -A with attached PHYs"). The solution there was to simply not call phy_set_asym_pause() under the &pl->state_mutex. That cannot be extended to our case though, where the phy_config_inband() call is much deeper inside the &pl->state_mutex section. Fixes: 5fd0f1a ("net: phylink: add negotiation of in-band capabilities") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250904125238.193990-2-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b816265 ] 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") simplified code by using the for_each_of_range() iterator, but it broke PCI enumeration on Turris Omnia (and probably other mvebu targets). Issue #1: To determine range.flags, of_pci_range_parser_one() uses bus->get_flags(), which resolves to of_bus_pci_get_flags(), which already returns an IORESOURCE bit field, and NOT the original flags from the "ranges" resource. Then mvebu_get_tgt_attr() attempts the very same conversion again. Remove the misinterpretation of range.flags in mvebu_get_tgt_attr(), to restore the intended behavior. Issue #2: The driver needs target and attributes, which are encoded in the raw address values of the "/soc/pcie/ranges" resource. According to of_pci_range_parser_one(), the raw values are stored in range.bus_addr and range.parent_bus_addr, respectively. range.cpu_addr is a translated version of range.parent_bus_addr, and not relevant here. Use the correct range structure member, to extract target and attributes. This restores the intended behavior. Fixes: 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"") Reported-by: Jan Palus <jpalus@fastmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220479 Signed-off-by: Klaus Kudielka <klaus.kudielka@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Tested-by: Tony Dinh <mibodhi@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jan Palus <jpalus@fastmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250907102303.29735-1-klaus.kudielka@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

This attemps to fix possible UAFs caused by struct mgmt_pending being freed while still being processed like in the following trace, in order to fix mgmt_pending_valid is introduce and use to check if the mgmt_pending hasn't been removed from the pending list, on the complete callbacks it is used to check and in addtion remove the cmd from the list while holding mgmt_pending_lock to avoid TOCTOU problems since if the cmd is left on the list it can still be accessed and freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880709d4dc0 by task kworker/u11:0/55 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 55 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.4 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16.4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 12210: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4364 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 __add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x130/0x200 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5247 add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x214/0x360 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5364 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1133 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 12221: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4648 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4847 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 __mgmt_power_off+0x169/0x350 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9444 hci_dev_close_sync+0x754/0x1330 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5290 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:501 [inline] hci_dev_close+0x108/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1192 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1313 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: cf75ad8 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_SET_POWERED") Fixes: 2bd1b23 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: f056a65 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: 3244845 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SSP") Fixes: d81a494 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LE") Fixes: b338d91 ("Bluetooth: Implement support for Mesh") Fixes: 6f6ff38 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME") Fixes: 71efbb0 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION") Fixes: b747a83 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Refactor add Adv Monitor") Fixes: abfeea4 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY") Fixes: 26ac4c5 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING") Reported-by: cen zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

Ido Schimmel says: ==================== nexthop: Various fixes Patch #1 fixes a NPD that was recently reported by syzbot. Patch #2 fixes an issue in the existing FIB nexthop selftest. Patch #3 extends the selftest with test cases for the bug that was fixed in the first patch. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250921150824.149157-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Leon Hwang says: ==================== bpf: Allow union argument in trampoline based programs While tracing 'release_pages' with bpfsnoop[0], the verifier reports: The function release_pages arg0 type UNION is unsupported. However, it should be acceptable to trace functions that have 'union' arguments. This patch set enables such support in the verifier by allowing 'union' as a valid argument type. Changes: v3 -> v4: * Address comments from Alexei: * Trim bpftrace output in patch #1 log. * Drop the referenced commit info and the test output in patch #2 log. v2 -> v3: * Address comments from Alexei: * Reuse the existing flag BTF_FMODEL_STRUCT_ARG. * Update the comment of the flag BTF_FMODEL_STRUCT_ARG. v1 -> v2: * Add 16B 'union' argument support in x86_64 trampoline. * Update selftests using bpf_testmod. * Add test case about 16-bytes 'union' argument. * Address comments from Alexei: * Study the patch set about 'struct' argument support. * Update selftests to cover more cases. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250905133226.84675-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev/ Links: [0] https://github.com/bpfsnoop/bpfsnoop ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250919044110.23729-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 65c7cde ] The discussion about removing the side effect of irq_set_affinity_hint() of actually applying the cpumask (if not NULL) as affinity to the interrupt, unearthed a few unpleasantries: 1) The modular perf drivers rely on the current behaviour for the very wrong reasons. 2) While none of the other drivers prevents user space from changing the affinity, a cursorily inspection shows that there are at least expectations in some drivers. #1 needs to be cleaned up anyway, so that's not a problem #2 might result in subtle regressions especially when irqbalanced (which nowadays ignores the affinity hint) is disabled. Provide new interfaces: irq_update_affinity_hint() - Only sets the affinity hint pointer irq_set_affinity_and_hint() - Set the pointer and apply the affinity to the interrupt Make irq_set_affinity_hint() a wrapper around irq_apply_affinity_hint() and document it to be phased out. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210501021832.743094-1-jesse.brandeburg@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210903152430.244937-2-nitesh@redhat.com Stable-dep-of: 915470e ("i40e: fix IRQ freeing in i40e_vsi_request_irq_msix error path") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1a251f5 ] This just standardizes the use of MIN() and MAX() macros, with the very traditional semantics. The goal is to use these for C constant expressions and for top-level / static initializers, and so be able to simplify the min()/max() macros. These macro names were used by various kernel code - they are very traditional, after all - and all such users have been fixed up, with a few different approaches: - trivial duplicated macro definitions have been removed Note that 'trivial' here means that it's obviously kernel code that already included all the major kernel headers, and thus gets the new generic MIN/MAX macros automatically. - non-trivial duplicated macro definitions are guarded with #ifndef This is the "yes, they define their own versions, but no, the include situation is not entirely obvious, and maybe they don't get the generic version automatically" case. - strange use case #1 A couple of drivers decided that the way they want to describe their versioning is with #define MAJ 1 #define MIN 2 #define DRV_VERSION __stringify(MAJ) "." __stringify(MIN) which adds zero value and I just did my Alexander the Great impersonation, and rewrote that pointless Gordian knot as #define DRV_VERSION "1.2" instead. - strange use case #2 A couple of drivers thought that it's a good idea to have a random 'MIN' or 'MAX' define for a value or index into a table, rather than the traditional macro that takes arguments. These values were re-written as C enum's instead. The new function-line macros only expand when followed by an open parenthesis, and thus don't clash with enum use. Happily, there weren't really all that many of these cases, and a lot of users already had the pattern of using '#ifndef' guarding (or in one case just using '#undef MIN') before defining their own private version that does the same thing. I left such cases alone. Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eliav Farber <farbere@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 302a1f6 ] This attemps to fix possible UAFs caused by struct mgmt_pending being freed while still being processed like in the following trace, in order to fix mgmt_pending_valid is introduce and use to check if the mgmt_pending hasn't been removed from the pending list, on the complete callbacks it is used to check and in addtion remove the cmd from the list while holding mgmt_pending_lock to avoid TOCTOU problems since if the cmd is left on the list it can still be accessed and freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880709d4dc0 by task kworker/u11:0/55 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 55 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.4 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16.4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 12210: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4364 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 __add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x130/0x200 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5247 add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x214/0x360 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5364 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1133 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 12221: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4648 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4847 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 __mgmt_power_off+0x169/0x350 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9444 hci_dev_close_sync+0x754/0x1330 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5290 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:501 [inline] hci_dev_close+0x108/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1192 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1313 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: cf75ad8 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_SET_POWERED") Fixes: 2bd1b23 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: f056a65 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE to use cmd_sync") Fixes: 3244845 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SSP") Fixes: d81a494 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LE") Fixes: b338d91 ("Bluetooth: Implement support for Mesh") Fixes: 6f6ff38 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME") Fixes: 71efbb0 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION") Fixes: b747a83 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Refactor add Adv Monitor") Fixes: abfeea4 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY") Fixes: 26ac4c5 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING") Reported-by: cen zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1a251f5 ] This just standardizes the use of MIN() and MAX() macros, with the very traditional semantics. The goal is to use these for C constant expressions and for top-level / static initializers, and so be able to simplify the min()/max() macros. These macro names were used by various kernel code - they are very traditional, after all - and all such users have been fixed up, with a few different approaches: - trivial duplicated macro definitions have been removed Note that 'trivial' here means that it's obviously kernel code that already included all the major kernel headers, and thus gets the new generic MIN/MAX macros automatically. - non-trivial duplicated macro definitions are guarded with #ifndef This is the "yes, they define their own versions, but no, the include situation is not entirely obvious, and maybe they don't get the generic version automatically" case. - strange use case #1 A couple of drivers decided that the way they want to describe their versioning is with #define MAJ 1 #define MIN 2 #define DRV_VERSION __stringify(MAJ) "." __stringify(MIN) which adds zero value and I just did my Alexander the Great impersonation, and rewrote that pointless Gordian knot as #define DRV_VERSION "1.2" instead. - strange use case #2 A couple of drivers thought that it's a good idea to have a random 'MIN' or 'MAX' define for a value or index into a table, rather than the traditional macro that takes arguments. These values were re-written as C enum's instead. The new function-line macros only expand when followed by an open parenthesis, and thus don't clash with enum use. Happily, there weren't really all that many of these cases, and a lot of users already had the pattern of using '#ifndef' guarding (or in one case just using '#undef MIN') before defining their own private version that does the same thing. I left such cases alone. Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eliav Farber <farbere@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

generic/091 may fail, then it bisects to the bad commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page"). What will cause generic/091 to fail is something like below Testcase #1: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 12k 3. truncate to 20k 4. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #1 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Analisys: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #3, in step 3), f2fs_setattr() will call f2fs_zero_post_eof_page() to drop all page cache post eof, includeing dirtied page #3, in step 4) when we read data from page #3, it will decompressed cluster and extra random data to page #3, finally, we hit the non-zeroed data post eof. However, the commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page") just let the issue be reproduced easily, w/o the commit, it can reproduce this bug w/ below Testcase #2: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 8k 3. truncate to 12k 4. truncate to 20k 5. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #2 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((8*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Anlysis: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #2 and #3, in step 3), we will truncate page #3 in page cache, in step 4), expand file size, in step 5), hit random data post eof w/ the same reason in Testcase #1. Root Cause: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), after we truncate partial data block on compressed cluster, all pages in cluster including the one post eof will be dirtied, after another tuncation, dirty page post eof will be dropped, however on-disk compressed cluster is still valid, it may include non-zero data post eof, result in exposing previous non-zero data post eof while reading. Fix: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), let change as below to fix: - call filemap_write_and_wait_range() to flush dirty page - call truncate_pagecache() to drop pages or zero partial page post eof - call f2fs_do_truncate_blocks() to truncate non-compress cluster to last valid block Fixes: 3265d3d ("f2fs: support partial truncation on compressed inode") Reported-by: Jan Prusakowski <jprusakowski@google.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

…lockup Since we use 16-bit precision, the raw data will undergo integer division, which may sometimes result in data loss. This can lead to slightly inaccurate CPU utilization calculations. Under normal circumstances, this isn't an issue. However, when CPU utilization reaches 100%, the calculated result might exceed 100%. For example, with raw data like the following: sample_period 400000134 new_stat 83648414036 old_stat 83247417494 sample_period=400000134/2^24=23 new_stat=83648414036/2^24=4985 old_stat=83247417494/2^24=4961 util=105% Below log will output： CPU#3 Utilization every 0s during lockup: #1: 0% system, 0% softirq, 105% hardirq, 0% idle #2: 0% system, 0% softirq, 105% hardirq, 0% idle #3: 0% system, 0% softirq, 100% hardirq, 0% idle #4: 0% system, 0% softirq, 105% hardirq, 0% idle #5: 0% system, 0% softirq, 105% hardirq, 0% idle To avoid confusion, we enforce a 100% display cap when calculations exceed this threshold. We also round to the nearest multiple of 16.8 milliseconds to improve the accuracy. [yaozhenguo1@gmail.com: make get_16bit_precision() more accurate, fix comment layout] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250818081438.40540-1-yaozhenguo@jd.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250812082510.32291-1-yaozhenguo@jd.com Signed-off-by: ZhenguoYao <yaozhenguo1@gmail.com> Cc: Bitao Hu <yaoma@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Cc: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

As JY reported in bugzilla [1], Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 pc : [0xffffffe51d249484] f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 lr : [0xffffffe51d24adbc] f2fs_merge_page_bio+0x520/0x6d4 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6790 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: P B W OE 6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 5f7701c9cbf727d1eebe77c89bbbeb3371e895e5 Tainted: [P]=PROPRIETARY_MODULE, [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-254:49) Call trace: f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x174/0x2f4 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x214/0x81c f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x28c/0x764 f2fs_write_data_pages+0x78c/0xce4 do_writepages+0xe8/0x2fc __writeback_single_inode+0x4c/0x4b4 writeback_sb_inodes+0x314/0x540 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xa4/0xf4 wb_writeback+0x160/0x448 wb_workfn+0x2f0/0x5dc process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x458 worker_thread+0x334/0x3f0 kthread+0x118/0x1ac ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220575 The panic was caused by UAF issue w/ below race condition: kworker - writepages - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #1 into bio & cache bio in io->bio_list - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - f2fs_inplace_write_data - f2fs_merge_page_bio - add_inu_page : cache page #2 into bio which is linked in io->bio_list write - f2fs_write_begin : write page #1 - f2fs_folio_wait_writeback - f2fs_submit_merged_ipu_write - f2fs_submit_write_bio : submit bio which inclues page #1 and #2 software IRQ - f2fs_write_end_io - fscrypt_free_bounce_page : freed bounced page which belongs to page #2 - inc_page_count( , WB_DATA_TYPE(data_folio), false) : data_folio points to fio->encrypted_page the bounced page can be freed before accessing it in f2fs_is_cp_guarantee() It can reproduce w/ below testcase: Run below script in shell #1: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" Run below script in shell #2: for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \ -c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync" So, in f2fs_merge_page_bio(), let's avoid using fio->encrypted_page after commit page into internal ipu cache. Fixes: 0b20fce ("f2fs: cache global IPU bio") Reported-by: JY <JY.Ho@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

When running as an SNP or TDX guest under KVM, force the legacy PCI hole, i.e. memory between Top of Lower Usable DRAM and 4GiB, to be mapped as UC via a forced variable MTRR range. In most KVM-based setups, legacy devices such as the HPET and TPM are enumerated via ACPI. ACPI enumeration includes a Memory32Fixed entry, and optionally a SystemMemory descriptor for an OperationRegion, e.g. if the device needs to be accessed via a Control Method. If a SystemMemory entry is present, then the kernel's ACPI driver will auto-ioremap the region so that it can be accessed at will. However, the ACPI spec doesn't provide a way to enumerate the memory type of SystemMemory regions, i.e. there's no way to tell software that a region must be mapped as UC vs. WB, etc. As a result, Linux's ACPI driver always maps SystemMemory regions using ioremap_cache(), i.e. as WB on x86. The dedicated device drivers however, e.g. the HPET driver and TPM driver, want to map their associated memory as UC or WC, as accessing PCI devices using WB is unsupported. On bare metal and non-CoCO, the conflicting requirements "work" as firmware configures the PCI hole (and other device memory) to be UC in the MTRRs. So even though the ACPI mappings request WB, they are forced to UC- in the kernel's tracking due to the kernel properly handling the MTRR overrides, and thus are compatible with the drivers' requested WC/UC-. With force WB MTRRs on SNP and TDX guests, the ACPI mappings get their requested WB if the ACPI mappings are established before the dedicated driver code attempts to initialize the device. E.g. if acpi_init() runs before the corresponding device driver is probed, ACPI's WB mapping will "win", and result in the driver's ioremap() failing because the existing WB mapping isn't compatible with the requested WC/UC-. E.g. when a TPM is emulated by the hypervisor (ignoring the security implications of relying on what is allegedly an untrusted entity to store measurements), the TPM driver will request UC and fail: [ 1.730459] ioremap error for 0xfed40000-0xfed45000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 [ 1.732780] tpm_tis MSFT0101:00: probe with driver tpm_tis failed with error -12 Note, the '0x2' and '0x0' values refer to "enum page_cache_mode", not x86's memtypes (which frustratingly are an almost pure inversion; 2 == WB, 0 == UC). E.g. tracing mapping requests for TPM TIS yields: Mapping TPM TIS with req_type = 0 WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:530 memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 Modules linked in: CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.16.0-rc7+ #2 VOLUNTARY Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/29/2025 RIP: 0010:memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460 __ioremap_caller+0x16d/0x3d0 ioremap_cache+0x17/0x30 x86_acpi_os_ioremap+0xe/0x20 acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1f3/0x240 acpi_os_map_memory+0xe/0x20 acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x273/0x440 acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x176/0x4c0 acpi_ex_access_region+0x2ad/0x530 acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0xa2/0x4f0 acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x296/0x3e0 acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0xd1/0x460 acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x2ee/0x530 acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x1f2/0x540 acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x11b/0x190 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x456/0x960 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x27a/0xa50 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x226/0x600 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x172/0x3e0 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x175/0x5f0 acpi_evaluate_object+0x213/0x490 acpi_evaluate_integer+0x6d/0x140 acpi_bus_get_status+0x93/0x150 acpi_add_single_object+0x43a/0x7c0 acpi_bus_check_add+0x149/0x3a0 acpi_bus_check_add_1+0x16/0x30 acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x22c/0x360 acpi_walk_namespace+0x15c/0x170 acpi_bus_scan+0x1dd/0x200 acpi_scan_init+0xe5/0x2b0 acpi_init+0x264/0x5b0 do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x310 kernel_init_freeable+0x34f/0x4f0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x186/0x1b0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> The above traces are from a Google-VMM based VM, but the same behavior happens with a QEMU based VM that is modified to add a SystemMemory range for the TPM TIS address space. The only reason this doesn't cause problems for HPET, which appears to require a SystemMemory region, is because HPET gets special treatment via x86_init.timers.timer_init(), and so gets a chance to create its UC- mapping before acpi_init() clobbers things. Disabling the early call to hpet_time_init() yields the same behavior for HPET: [ 0.318264] ioremap error for 0xfed00000-0xfed01000, requested 0x2, got 0x0 Hack around the ACPI gap by forcing the legacy PCI hole to UC when overriding the (virtual) MTRRs for CoCo guest, so that ioremap handling of MTRRs naturally kicks in and forces the ACPI mappings to be UC. Note, the requested/mapped memtype doesn't actually matter in terms of accessing the device. In practically every setup, legacy PCI devices are emulated by the hypervisor, and accesses are intercepted and handled as emulated MMIO, i.e. never access physical memory and thus don't have an effective memtype. Even in a theoretical setup where such devices are passed through by the host, i.e. point at real MMIO memory, it is KVM's (as the hypervisor) responsibility to force the memory to be WC/UC, e.g. via EPT memtype under TDX or real hardware MTRRs under SNP. Not doing so cannot work, and the hypervisor is highly motivated to do the right thing as letting the guest access hardware MMIO with WB would likely result in a variety of fatal #MCs. In other words, forcing the range to be UC is all about coercing the kernel's tracking into thinking that it has established UC mappings, so that the ioremap code doesn't reject mappings from e.g. the TPM driver and thus prevent the driver from loading and the device from functioning. Note #2, relying on guest firmware to handle this scenario, e.g. by setting virtual MTRRs and then consuming them in Linux, is not a viable option, as the virtual MTRR state is managed by the untrusted hypervisor, and because OVMF at least has stopped programming virtual MTRRs when running as a TDX guest. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8137d98e-8825-415b-9282-1d2a115bb51a@linux.intel.com Fixes: 8e690b8 ("x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jürgen Groß <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Korakit Seemakhupt <korakit@google.com> Cc: Jianxiong Gao <jxgao@google.com> Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Suggested-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Korakit Seemakhupt <korakit@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250828005249.39339-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

We're generally not proponents of rewrites (nasty uncomfortable things that make you late for dinner!). So why rewrite Binder? Binder has been evolving over the past 15+ years to meet the evolving needs of Android. Its responsibilities, expectations, and complexity have grown considerably during that time. While we expect Binder to continue to evolve along with Android, there are a number of factors that currently constrain our ability to develop/maintain it. Briefly those are: 1. Complexity: Binder is at the intersection of everything in Android and fulfills many responsibilities beyond IPC. It has become many things to many people, and due to its many features and their interactions with each other, its complexity is quite high. In just 6kLOC it must deliver transactions to the right threads. It must correctly parse and translate the contents of transactions, which can contain several objects of different types (e.g., pointers, fds) that can interact with each other. It controls the size of thread pools in userspace, and ensures that transactions are assigned to threads in ways that avoid deadlocks where the threadpool has run out of threads. It must track refcounts of objects that are shared by several processes by forwarding refcount changes between the processes correctly. It must handle numerous error scenarios and it combines/nests 13 different locks, 7 reference counters, and atomic variables. Finally, It must do all of this as fast and efficiently as possible. Minor performance regressions can cause a noticeably degraded user experience. 2. Things to improve: Thousand-line functions [1], error-prone error handling [2], and confusing structure can occur as a code base grows organically. After more than a decade of development, this codebase could use an overhaul. [1]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/android/binder.c?h=v6.5#n2896 [2]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/drivers/android/binder.c?h=v6.5#n3658 3. Security critical: Binder is a critical part of Android's sandboxing strategy. Even Android's most de-privileged sandboxes (e.g. the Chrome renderer, or SW Codec) have direct access to Binder. More than just about any other component, it's important that Binder provide robust security, and itself be robust against security vulnerabilities. It's #1 (high complexity) that has made continuing to evolve Binder and resolving #2 (tech debt) exceptionally difficult without causing #3 (security issues). For Binder to continue to meet Android's needs, we need better ways to manage (and reduce!) complexity without increasing the risk. The biggest change is obviously the choice of programming language. We decided to use Rust because it directly addresses a number of the challenges within Binder that we have faced during the last years. It prevents mistakes with ref counting, locking, bounds checking, and also does a lot to reduce the complexity of error handling. Additionally, we've been able to use the more expressive type system to encode the ownership semantics of the various structs and pointers, which takes the complexity of managing object lifetimes out of the hands of the programmer, reducing the risk of use-after-frees and similar problems. Rust has many different pointer types that it uses to encode ownership semantics into the type system, and this is probably one of the most important aspects of how it helps in Binder. The Binder driver has a lot of different objects that have complex ownership semantics; some pointers own a refcount, some pointers have exclusive ownership, and some pointers just reference the object and it is kept alive in some other manner. With Rust, we can use a different pointer type for each kind of pointer, which enables the compiler to enforce that the ownership semantics are implemented correctly. Another useful feature is Rust's error handling. Rust allows for more simplified error handling with features such as destructors, and you get compilation failures if errors are not properly handled. This means that even though Rust requires you to spend more lines of code than C on things such as writing down invariants that are left implicit in C, the Rust driver is still slightly smaller than C binder: Rust is 5.5kLOC and C is 5.8kLOC. (These numbers are excluding blank lines, comments, binderfs, and any debugging facilities in C that are not yet implemented in the Rust driver. The numbers include abstractions in rust/kernel/ that are unlikely to be used by other drivers than Binder.) Although this rewrite completely rethinks how the code is structured and how assumptions are enforced, we do not fundamentally change *how* the driver does the things it does. A lot of careful thought has gone into the existing design. The rewrite is aimed rather at improving code health, structure, readability, robustness, security, maintainability and extensibility. We also include more inline documentation, and improve how assumptions in the code are enforced. Furthermore, all unsafe code is annotated with a SAFETY comment that explains why it is correct. We have left the binderfs filesystem component in C. Rewriting it in Rust would be a large amount of work and requires a lot of bindings to the file system interfaces. Binderfs has not historically had the same challenges with security and complexity, so rewriting binderfs seems to have lower value than the rest of Binder. Correctness and feature parity ------------------------------ Rust binder passes all tests that validate the correctness of Binder in the Android Open Source Project. We can boot a device, and run a variety of apps and functionality without issues. We have performed this both on the Cuttlefish Android emulator device, and on a Pixel 6 Pro. As for feature parity, Rust binder currently implements all features that C binder supports, with the exception of some debugging facilities. The missing debugging facilities will be added before we submit the Rust implementation upstream. Tracepoints ----------- I did not include all of the tracepoints as I felt that the mechansim for making C access fields of Rust structs should be discussed on list separately. I also did not include the support for building Rust Binder as a module since that requires exporting a bunch of additional symbols on the C side. Original RFC Link with old benchmark numbers: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231101-rust-binder-v1-0-08ba9197f637@google.com Co-developed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Matt Gilbride <mattgilbride@google.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Gilbride <mattgilbride@google.com> Acked-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919-rust-binder-v2-1-a384b09f28dd@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Check for an invalid length during LAUNCH_UPDATE at the start of snp_launch_update() instead of subtly relying on kvm_gmem_populate() to detect the bad state. Code that directly handles userspace input absolutely should sanitize those inputs; failure to do so is asking for bugs where KVM consumes an invalid "npages". Keep the check in gmem, but wrap it in a WARN to flag any bad usage by the caller. Note, this is technically an ABI change as KVM would previously allow a length of '0'. But allowing a length of '0' is nonsensical and creates pointless conundrums in KVM. E.g. an empty range is arguably neither private nor shared, but LAUNCH_UPDATE will fail if the starting gpa can't be made private. In practice, no known or well-behaved VMM passes a length of '0'. Note #2, the PAGE_ALIGNED(params.len) check ensures that lengths between 1 and 4095 (inclusive) are also rejected, i.e. that KVM won't end up with npages=0 when doing "npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE". Cc: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919211649.1575654-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Don't emulate branch instructions, e.g. CALL/RET/JMP etc., that are affected by Shadow Stacks and/or Indirect Branch Tracking when said features are enabled in the guest, as fully emulating CET would require significant complexity for no practical benefit (KVM shouldn't need to emulate branch instructions on modern hosts). Simply doing nothing isn't an option as that would allow a malicious entity to subvert CET protections via the emulator. To detect instructions that are subject to IBT or affect IBT state, use the existing IsBranch flag along with the source operand type to detect indirect branches, and the existing NearBranch flag to detect far JMPs and CALLs, all of which are effectively indirect. Explicitly check for emulation of IRET, FAR RET (IMM), and SYSEXIT (the ret-like far branches) instead of adding another flag, e.g. IsRet, as it's unlikely the emulator will ever need to check for return-like instructions outside of this one specific flow. Use an allow-list instead of a deny-list because (a) it's a shorter list and (b) so that a missed entry gets a false positive, not a false negative (i.e. reject emulation instead of clobbering CET state). For Shadow Stacks, explicitly track instructions that directly affect the current SSP, as KVM's emulator doesn't have existing flags that can be used to precisely detect such instructions. Alternatively, the em_xxx() helpers could directly check for ShadowStack interactions, but using a dedicated flag is arguably easier to audit, and allows for handling both IBT and SHSTK in one fell swoop. Note! On far transfers, do NOT consult the current privilege level and instead treat SHSTK/IBT as being enabled if they're enabled for User *or* Supervisor mode. On inter-privilege level far transfers, SHSTK and IBT can be in play for the target privilege level, i.e. checking the current privilege could get a false negative, and KVM doesn't know the target privilege level until emulation gets under way. Note #2, FAR JMP from 64-bit mode to compatibility mode interacts with the current SSP, but only to ensure SSP[63:32] == 0. Don't tag FAR JMP as SHSTK, which would be rather confusing and would result in FAR JMP being rejected unnecessarily the vast majority of the time (ignoring that it's unlikely to ever be emulated). A future commit will add the #GP(0) check for the specific FAR JMP scenario. Note #3, task switches also modify SSP and so need to be rejected. That too will be addressed in a future commit. Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Originally-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919223258.1604852-19-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 #10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com

pmenzel closed this as completed Mar 24, 2022

Where is the update script? #2

Where is the update script? #2

pmenzel commented Mar 24, 2022

donald commented Mar 24, 2022

pmenzel commented Mar 24, 2022

donald commented Mar 24, 2022

Where is the update script? #2

Where is the update script? #2

Comments

pmenzel commented Mar 24, 2022

donald commented Mar 24, 2022

pmenzel commented Mar 24, 2022

donald commented Mar 24, 2022