Return of the sync_check #5

donald · 2023-09-13T07:50:05Z

Looks like another 'sync_action "check" to "idle" transition' bug.

root@done:~# ps -fp 24153
UID        PID  PPID  C STIME TTY          TIME CMD
root     24153     1  0 06:00 ?        00:00:00 /bin/bash /usr/bin/mdcheck.safe --duration 06:00
root@done:~# cat /proc/24153/stack 
[<0>] kthread_stop+0x74/0x190
[<0>] md_unregister_thread+0x43/0x80
[<0>] action_store+0x169/0x2d0
[<0>] md_attr_store+0x80/0xf0
[<0>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x114/0x1b0
[<0>] vfs_write+0x2cb/0x400
[<0>] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce
root@done:~# cat /proc/mdstat 
Personalities : [linear] [raid0] [raid1] [raid6] [raid5] [raid4] [multipath] 
md2 : active raid6 sdc[0] sdo[15] sdn[14] sdm[13] sdl[12] sdk[11] sdj[10] sdi[9] sdh[8] sdg[7] sdf[6] sde[5] sdd[4] sdr[3] sdq[2] sdp[1]
      109394518016 blocks super 1.2 level 6, 512k chunk, algorithm 2 [16/16] [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU]
      bitmap: 0/59 pages [0KB], 65536KB chunk

md1 : active raid6 sdaa[0] sdz[15] sdy[14] sdx[13] sdw[12] sdv[11] sdu[10] sdt[16] sds[8] sdah[7] sdag[17] sdaf[5] sdae[4] sdad[3] sdac[2] sdab[1]
      109394518016 blocks super 1.2 level 6, 512k chunk, algorithm 2 [16/16] [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU]
      bitmap: 1/59 pages [4KB], 65536KB chunk

md0 : active raid6 sdai[0] sdax[15] sdaw[16] sdav[13] sdau[12] sdat[11] sdas[10] sdar[9] sdaq[8] sdap[7] sdao[6] sdan[17] sdam[4] sdal[3] sdak[2] sdaj[1]
      109394518016 blocks super 1.2 level 6, 512k chunk, algorithm 2 [16/16] [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU]
      [>....................]  check =  2.5% (196401792/7813894144) finish=1035822.1min speed=122K/sec
      bitmap: 51/59 pages [204KB], 65536KB chunk

unused devices: <none>

The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:

[ Upstream commit 60dd283 ] After loading the amd-pstate-ut driver, amd_pstate_ut_check_perf() and amd_pstate_ut_check_freq() use cpufreq_cpu_get() to get the policy of the CPU and mark it as busy. In these functions, cpufreq_cpu_put() should be used to release the policy, but it is not, so any other entity trying to access the policy is blocked indefinitely. One such scenario is when amd_pstate mode is changed, leading to the following splat: [ 1332.103727] INFO: task bash:2929 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1332.110001] Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2-amd-pstate-ut #5 [ 1332.115315] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1332.123140] task:bash state:D stack:0 pid:2929 ppid:2873 flags:0x00004006 [ 1332.123143] Call Trace: [ 1332.123145] <TASK> [ 1332.123148] __schedule+0x3c1/0x16a0 [ 1332.123154] ? _raw_read_lock_irqsave+0x2d/0x70 [ 1332.123157] schedule+0x6f/0x110 [ 1332.123160] schedule_timeout+0x14f/0x160 [ 1332.123162] ? preempt_count_add+0x86/0xd0 [ 1332.123165] __wait_for_common+0x92/0x190 [ 1332.123168] ? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10 [ 1332.123170] wait_for_completion+0x28/0x30 [ 1332.123173] cpufreq_policy_put_kobj+0x4d/0x90 [ 1332.123177] cpufreq_policy_free+0x157/0x1d0 [ 1332.123178] ? preempt_count_add+0x58/0xd0 [ 1332.123180] cpufreq_remove_dev+0xb6/0x100 [ 1332.123182] subsys_interface_unregister+0x114/0x120 [ 1332.123185] ? preempt_count_add+0x58/0xd0 [ 1332.123187] ? __pfx_amd_pstate_change_driver_mode+0x10/0x10 [ 1332.123190] cpufreq_unregister_driver+0x3b/0xd0 [ 1332.123192] amd_pstate_change_driver_mode+0x1e/0x50 [ 1332.123194] store_status+0xe9/0x180 [ 1332.123197] dev_attr_store+0x1b/0x30 [ 1332.123199] sysfs_kf_write+0x42/0x50 [ 1332.123202] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x143/0x1d0 [ 1332.123204] vfs_write+0x2df/0x400 [ 1332.123208] ksys_write+0x6b/0xf0 [ 1332.123210] __x64_sys_write+0x1d/0x30 [ 1332.123213] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90 [ 1332.123216] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x2e/0x50 [ 1332.123219] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x49/0x1a0 [ 1332.123223] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xd/0x20 [ 1332.123225] ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 [ 1332.123226] ? exc_page_fault+0x8e/0x190 [ 1332.123228] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 [ 1332.123232] RIP: 0033:0x7fa74c514a37 [ 1332.123234] RSP: 002b:00007ffe31dd0788 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 1332.123238] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 00007fa74c514a37 [ 1332.123239] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 000055e27c447aa0 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 1332.123241] RBP: 000055e27c447aa0 R08: 00007fa74c5d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff [ 1332.123242] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000008 [ 1332.123244] R13: 00007fa74c61a780 R14: 00007fa74c616600 R15: 00007fa74c615a00 [ 1332.123247] </TASK> Fix this by calling cpufreq_cpu_put() wherever necessary. Fixes: 14eb1c9 ("cpufreq: amd-pstate: Add test module for amd-pstate driver") Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Meng Li <li.meng@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com> Suggested-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Swapnil Sapkal <swapnil.sapkal@amd.com> [ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ef23cb5 ] While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling: perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1)) Resulting in: (gdb) run lock contention Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1". failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory (try 'perf record' first) Initializing perf session failed Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 2858 if (!session->auxtrace) (gdb) p session $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 #1 0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300 #2 0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161 #3 0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604 #4 0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322 #5 0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375 #6 0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419 #7 0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535 (gdb) So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported. The same problem was found in 'perf top' after an audit of all perf_session__new() failure handling. Fixes: 6ef81c5 ("perf session: Return error code for perf_session__new() function on failure") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jeremie Galarneau <jeremie.galarneau@efficios.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Shawn Landden <shawn@git.icu> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tstoyanov@vmware.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZN4Q2rxxsL08A8rd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ade32bd ] unix_tot_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but unix_release_sock() reads it locklessly. Let's use READ_ONCE() for unix_tot_inflight. Note that the writer side was marked by commit 9d6d7f1 ("af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress") BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / unix_release_sock write (marked) to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 123 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x130/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:64 unix_attach_fds+0x137/0x1b0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1832 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1955 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2493 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2547 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2576 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2585 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2583 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 4891 on cpu 0: unix_release_sock+0x608/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:671 unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1058 __sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1385 __fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349 task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 4891 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-01219-gfa0e21fa4443 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 9305cfa ("[AF_UNIX]: Make unix_tot_inflight counter non-atomic") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ] In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system, "syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp system wasn't 'syscalls'. Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which should be equivalent. Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function. This resolves these leaks, detected with: $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin ================================================================= ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212 #7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205 #7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). [root@quaco ~]# With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1". Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230719202951.534582-5-acme@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ef23cb5 ] While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling: perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1)) Resulting in: (gdb) run lock contention Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1". failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory (try 'perf record' first) Initializing perf session failed Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 2858 if (!session->auxtrace) (gdb) p session $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 #1 0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300 #2 0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161 #3 0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604 #4 0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322 #5 0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375 #6 0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419 #7 0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535 (gdb) So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported. The same problem was found in 'perf top' after an audit of all perf_session__new() failure handling. Fixes: 6ef81c5 ("perf session: Return error code for perf_session__new() function on failure") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jeremie Galarneau <jeremie.galarneau@efficios.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Shawn Landden <shawn@git.icu> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tstoyanov@vmware.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZN4Q2rxxsL08A8rd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ade32bd ] unix_tot_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but unix_release_sock() reads it locklessly. Let's use READ_ONCE() for unix_tot_inflight. Note that the writer side was marked by commit 9d6d7f1 ("af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress") BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / unix_release_sock write (marked) to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 123 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x130/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:64 unix_attach_fds+0x137/0x1b0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1832 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1955 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2493 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2547 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2576 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2585 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2583 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 4891 on cpu 0: unix_release_sock+0x608/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:671 unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1058 __sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1385 __fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349 task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 4891 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-01219-gfa0e21fa4443 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 9305cfa ("[AF_UNIX]: Make unix_tot_inflight counter non-atomic") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ] In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system, "syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp system wasn't 'syscalls'. Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which should be equivalent. Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function. This resolves these leaks, detected with: $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin ================================================================= ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212 #7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205 #7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). [root@quaco ~]# With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1". Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230719202951.534582-5-acme@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ef23cb5 ] While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling: perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1)) Resulting in: (gdb) run lock contention Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1". failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory (try 'perf record' first) Initializing perf session failed Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 2858 if (!session->auxtrace) (gdb) p session $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 #1 0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300 #2 0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161 #3 0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604 #4 0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322 #5 0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375 #6 0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419 #7 0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535 (gdb) So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported. The same problem was found in 'perf top' after an audit of all perf_session__new() failure handling. Fixes: 6ef81c5 ("perf session: Return error code for perf_session__new() function on failure") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jeremie Galarneau <jeremie.galarneau@efficios.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Shawn Landden <shawn@git.icu> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tstoyanov@vmware.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZN4Q2rxxsL08A8rd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ade32bd ] unix_tot_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but unix_release_sock() reads it locklessly. Let's use READ_ONCE() for unix_tot_inflight. Note that the writer side was marked by commit 9d6d7f1 ("af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress") BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / unix_release_sock write (marked) to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 123 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x130/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:64 unix_attach_fds+0x137/0x1b0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1832 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1955 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2493 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2547 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2576 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2585 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2583 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 4891 on cpu 0: unix_release_sock+0x608/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:671 unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1058 __sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1385 __fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349 task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 4891 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-01219-gfa0e21fa4443 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 9305cfa ("[AF_UNIX]: Make unix_tot_inflight counter non-atomic") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ] In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system, "syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp system wasn't 'syscalls'. Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which should be equivalent. Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function. This resolves these leaks, detected with: $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin ================================================================= ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212 #7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205 #7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). [root@quaco ~]# With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1". Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230719202951.534582-5-acme@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ef23cb5 ] While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling: perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1)) Resulting in: (gdb) run lock contention Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1". failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory (try 'perf record' first) Initializing perf session failed Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 2858 if (!session->auxtrace) (gdb) p session $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 #1 0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300 #2 0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161 #3 0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604 #4 0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322 #5 0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375 #6 0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419 #7 0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535 (gdb) So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported. The same problem was found in 'perf top' after an audit of all perf_session__new() failure handling. Fixes: 6ef81c5 ("perf session: Return error code for perf_session__new() function on failure") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jeremie Galarneau <jeremie.galarneau@efficios.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Cc: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Shawn Landden <shawn@git.icu> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tzvetomir Stoyanov <tstoyanov@vmware.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZN4Q2rxxsL08A8rd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit abaf1e0 ] While debugging a segfault on 'perf lock contention' without an available perf.data file I noticed that it was basically calling: perf_session__delete(ERR_PTR(-1)) Resulting in: (gdb) run lock contention Starting program: /root/bin/perf lock contention [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1". failed to open perf.data: No such file or directory (try 'perf record' first) Initializing perf session failed Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 2858 if (!session->auxtrace) (gdb) p session $1 = (struct perf_session *) 0xffffffffffffffff (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005e7515 in auxtrace__free (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/auxtrace.c:2858 #1 0x000000000057bb4d in perf_session__delete (session=0xffffffffffffffff) at util/session.c:300 #2 0x000000000047c421 in __cmd_contention (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2161 #3 0x000000000047dc95 in cmd_lock (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at builtin-lock.c:2604 #4 0x0000000000501466 in run_builtin (p=0xe597a8 <commands+552>, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:322 #5 0x00000000005016d5 in handle_internal_command (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:375 #6 0x0000000000501824 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe02c, argv=0x7fffffffe020) at perf.c:419 #7 0x0000000000501b11 in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffe200) at perf.c:535 (gdb) So just set it to NULL after using PTR_ERR(session) to decode the error as perf_session__delete(NULL) is supported. Fixes: eef4fee ("perf lock: Dynamically allocate lockhash_table") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org> Cc: Mamatha Inamdar <mamatha4@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@chromium.org> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn> Cc: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZN4R1AYfsD2J8lRs@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ade32bd ] unix_tot_inflight is changed under spin_lock(unix_gc_lock), but unix_release_sock() reads it locklessly. Let's use READ_ONCE() for unix_tot_inflight. Note that the writer side was marked by commit 9d6d7f1 ("af_unix: annote lockless accesses to unix_tot_inflight & gc_in_progress") BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_inflight / unix_release_sock write (marked) to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 123 on cpu 1: unix_inflight+0x130/0x180 net/unix/scm.c:64 unix_attach_fds+0x137/0x1b0 net/unix/scm.c:123 unix_scm_to_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:1832 [inline] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x46a/0x14f0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1955 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x148/0x160 net/socket.c:747 ____sys_sendmsg+0x4e4/0x610 net/socket.c:2493 ___sys_sendmsg+0xc6/0x140 net/socket.c:2547 __sys_sendmsg+0x94/0x140 net/socket.c:2576 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2585 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2583 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x45/0x50 net/socket.c:2583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc read to 0xffffffff871852b8 of 4 bytes by task 4891 on cpu 0: unix_release_sock+0x608/0x910 net/unix/af_unix.c:671 unix_release+0x59/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1058 __sock_release+0x7d/0x170 net/socket.c:653 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1385 __fput+0x179/0x5e0 fs/file_table.c:321 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:349 task_work_run+0x116/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x174/0x180 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1a/0x30 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 4891 Comm: systemd-coredum Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-01219-gfa0e21fa4443 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Fixes: 9305cfa ("[AF_UNIX]: Make unix_tot_inflight counter non-atomic") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says: ==================== net: hsr: Properly parse HSRv1 supervisor frames. this is a follow-up to https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230825153111.228768-1-lukma@denx.de/ replacing https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914124731.1654059-1-lukma@denx.de/ by grabing/ adding tags and reposting with a commit message plus a missing __packed to a struct (#2) plus extending the testsuite to sover HSRv1 which is what broke here (#3-#5). HSRv0 is (was) not affected. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer: ``` ==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6 #1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2 #2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9 #3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32 #4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6 #5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8 #6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8 #7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9 #8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8 #9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15 #10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9 #11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8 #12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5 #13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9 #14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11 #15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8 #16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2 #17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3 ``` Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914022425.1489035-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>

The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 #10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] #11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc #12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] #13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] #14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] #15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] #16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 #17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>

[ Upstream commit a154f5f ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 #10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] #11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc #12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] #13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] #14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] #15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] #16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 #17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 374012b upstream. Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Commit b035f5a ("mm: slab: reduce the kmalloc() minimum alignment if DMA bouncing possible") allows architectures with non-coherent DMA to define a small ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN (e.g. sizeof(unsigned long long)) and this has been enabled on arm64. With KASAN_HW_TAGS enabled, however, ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN becomes 16 on arm64 (arch_slab_minalign() dynamically selects it since commit d949a81 ("mm: make minimum slab alignment a runtime property")). This can lead to a situation where kmalloc-8 caches are attempted to be created with a kmem_caches.size aligned to 16. When the cache is mergeable, it can lead to kernel warnings like: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/kernel/slab/:d-0000016' CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-00001-gda98843cd306-dirty #5 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 sysfs_warn_dup+0x64/0x80 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xe8/0x108 kobject_add_internal+0x98/0x264 kobject_init_and_add+0x8c/0xd8 sysfs_slab_add+0x12c/0x248 slab_sysfs_init+0x98/0x14c do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x1b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x1c0/0x288 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for :d-0000016 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. SLUB: Unable to add boot slab dma-kmalloc-8 to sysfs Limit the __kmalloc_minalign() return value (used to create the kmalloc-* caches) to arch_slab_minalign() so that kmalloc-8 caches are skipped when KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled (both config and runtime). Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Fixes: b035f5a ("mm: slab: reduce the kmalloc() minimum alignment if DMA bouncing possible") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.5.x Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>

commit b502c87 upstream. If an UNDEFINED exception is taken from EL1, and do_undefinstr() doesn't find any suitable undef_hook, it will call: BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs)) ... and the kernel will report a failure witin do_undefinstr() rather than reporting the original context that the UNDEFINED exception was taken from. The pt_regs and ESR value reported within the BUG() handler will be from within do_undefinstr() and the code dump will be for the BRK in BUG_ON(), which isn't sufficient to debug the cause of the original exception. This patch makes the reporting better by having do_undefinstr() call die() directly in this case to report the original context from which the UNDEFINED exception was taken. Prior to this patch, an undefined instruction is reported as: | kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:497! | Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00127-geff044f1b04e-dirty #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 000000c5 (nzcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : do_undefinstr+0x28c/0x2ac | lr : do_undefinstr+0x298/0x2ac | sp : ffff800009f63bc0 | x29: ffff800009f63bc0 x28: ffff800009f73c00 x27: ffff800009644a70 | x26: ffff8000096778a8 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 00000000800000c5 x22: ffff800009894060 x21: ffff800009f63d90 | x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800009f63c40 x18: 0000000000000006 | x17: 0000000000403000 x16: 00000000bfbfd000 x15: ffff800009f63830 | x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000019 | x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 0000000000161b98 x9 : 0000000000000000 | x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 | x5 : ffff800009f761d0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff80000a2b80f8 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff800009f73c00 x0 : 00000000800000c5 | Call trace: | do_undefinstr+0x28c/0x2ac | el1_undef+0x2c/0x4c | el1h_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xd0 | el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 | setup_arch+0x550/0x598 | start_kernel+0x88/0x6ac | __primary_switched+0xb8/0xc0 | Code: 17ffff95 a9425bf5 17ffffb8 a9025bf5 (d4210000) With this patch applied, an undefined instruction is reported as: | Internal error: Oops - Undefined instruction: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | Modules linked in: | CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00128-gf27cfcc80e52-dirty #5 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 800000c5 (Nzcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : setup_arch+0x550/0x598 | lr : setup_arch+0x50c/0x598 | sp : ffff800009f63d90 | x29: ffff800009f63d90 x28: 0000000081000200 x27: ffff800009644a70 | x26: ffff8000096778c8 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: 0000000000000100 x22: ffff800009f69a58 x21: ffff80000a2b80b8 | x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000006 | x17: 0000000000403000 x16: 00000000bfbfd000 x15: ffff800009f63830 | x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000019 | x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 0000000000161b98 x9 : 0000000000000000 | x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 | x5 : 0000000000000008 x4 : 0000000000000010 x3 : 0000000000000000 | x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | setup_arch+0x550/0x598 | start_kernel+0x88/0x6ac | __primary_switched+0xb8/0xc0 | Code: b4000080 90ffed80 912ac000 97db745f (00000000) Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Cc: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220913101732.3925290-2-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c15cdea upstream. Commit b035f5a ("mm: slab: reduce the kmalloc() minimum alignment if DMA bouncing possible") allows architectures with non-coherent DMA to define a small ARCH_KMALLOC_MINALIGN (e.g. sizeof(unsigned long long)) and this has been enabled on arm64. With KASAN_HW_TAGS enabled, however, ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN becomes 16 on arm64 (arch_slab_minalign() dynamically selects it since commit d949a81 ("mm: make minimum slab alignment a runtime property")). This can lead to a situation where kmalloc-8 caches are attempted to be created with a kmem_caches.size aligned to 16. When the cache is mergeable, it can lead to kernel warnings like: sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/kernel/slab/:d-0000016' CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-00001-gda98843cd306-dirty #5 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 sysfs_warn_dup+0x64/0x80 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xe8/0x108 kobject_add_internal+0x98/0x264 kobject_init_and_add+0x8c/0xd8 sysfs_slab_add+0x12c/0x248 slab_sysfs_init+0x98/0x14c do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x1b0 kernel_init_freeable+0x1c0/0x288 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for :d-0000016 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. SLUB: Unable to add boot slab dma-kmalloc-8 to sysfs Limit the __kmalloc_minalign() return value (used to create the kmalloc-* caches) to arch_slab_minalign() so that kmalloc-8 caches are skipped when KASAN_HW_TAGS is enabled (both config and runtime). Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Fixes: b035f5a ("mm: slab: reduce the kmalloc() minimum alignment if DMA bouncing possible") Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.5.x Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 #7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 #8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 #9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 #10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 #11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 #12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…e probe [ Upstream commit dcaeeb8 ] The spin lock tx_handling_spinlock in struct m_can_classdev is not being initialized. This leads the following spinlock bad magic complaint from the kernel, eg. when trying to send CAN frames with cansend from can-utils: | BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#0, cansend/95 | lock: 0xff60000002ec1010, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0 | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 95 Comm: cansend Not tainted 6.15.0-rc3-00032-ga79be02bba5c #5 NONE | Hardware name: MachineWare SIM-V (DT) | Call Trace: | [<ffffffff800133e0>] dump_backtrace+0x1c/0x24 | [<ffffffff800022f2>] show_stack+0x28/0x34 | [<ffffffff8000de3e>] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x68 | [<ffffffff8000de70>] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c | [<ffffffff80003134>] spin_dump+0x62/0x6e | [<ffffffff800883ba>] do_raw_spin_lock+0xd0/0x142 | [<ffffffff807a6fcc>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x20/0x2c | [<ffffffff80536dba>] m_can_start_xmit+0x90/0x34a | [<ffffffff806148b0>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa6/0xee | [<ffffffff8065b730>] sch_direct_xmit+0x114/0x292 | [<ffffffff80614e2a>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x3b0/0xaa8 | [<ffffffff8073b8fa>] can_send+0xc6/0x242 | [<ffffffff8073d1c0>] raw_sendmsg+0x1a8/0x36c | [<ffffffff805ebf06>] sock_write_iter+0x9a/0xee | [<ffffffff801d06ea>] vfs_write+0x184/0x3a6 | [<ffffffff801d0a88>] ksys_write+0xa0/0xc0 | [<ffffffff801d0abc>] __riscv_sys_write+0x14/0x1c | [<ffffffff8079ebf8>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x168/0x212 | [<ffffffff807a830a>] handle_exception+0x146/0x152 Initializing the spin lock in m_can_class_allocate_dev solves that problem. Fixes: 1fa80e2 ("can: m_can: Introduce a tx_fifo_in_flight counter") Signed-off-by: Antonios Salios <antonios@mwa.re> Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250425111744.37604-2-antonios@mwa.re Reviewed-by: Markus Schneider-Pargmann <msp@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…xit() scheduler's ->exit() is called with queue frozen and elevator lock is held, and wbt_enable_default() can't be called with queue frozen, otherwise the following lockdep warning is triggered: #6 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: #5 (&eq->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #4 (&q->elevator_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#3){++++}-{0:0}: #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}: #0 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: Fix the issue by moving wbt_enable_default() out of bfq's exit(), and call it from elevator_change_done(). Meantime add disk->rqos_state_mutex for covering wbt state change, which matches the purpose more than ->elevator_lock. Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505141805.2751237-26-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: https://github.com/NetBSD/src/commit/b69d1ac3f7702f67edfe412e4392f77d09804910 and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/792674400f6f04a074a3827349ed0e2ac10067f6 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 #10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f #11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf #12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 #13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 #14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d #15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e #16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad #17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e #18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 #19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 #20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 #21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 #22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 #23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 #24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 #25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc #26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 #27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 #28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 #29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d #30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 #31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 #32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 #33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d #34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 #35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e #36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 #37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 #38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 #39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 #40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 #41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER; tdh_vp_enter() needs to be noinstr because VM entry in KVM is noinstr as well, which is for two reasons: * marking the area as CT_STATE_GUEST via guest_state_enter_irqoff() and guest_state_exit_irqoff() * IRET must be avoided between VM-exit and NMI handling, in order to avoid prematurely releasing the NMI inhibit. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLs in several ways: it uses more arguments, and after it returns some host state may need to be restored. Therefore tdh_vp_enter() uses __seamcall_saved_ret() instead of __seamcall_ret(); since it is the only caller of __seamcall_saved_ret(), it can be made noinstr also. TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Message-ID: <20241121201448.36170-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 88f7f56 ] When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush() generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC, which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait(). An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream: crash> bt 2091206 PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0" #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8 #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4 #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4 #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4 #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0 #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254 #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38 #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138 #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4 #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs] #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs] #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs] #13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs] #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs] #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs] #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08 #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4 After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"), the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled. But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly causes the metadata bio to be throttled. Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait(). Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <alexjlzheng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <txpeng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <flyingpeng@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f6205f8 ] The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2]. Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE(). [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0: vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2: vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [2] #!/bin/bash set +H echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250204145549.1216254-2-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 88f7f56 ] When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush() generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC, which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait(). An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream: crash> bt 2091206 PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0" #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8 #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4 #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4 #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4 #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0 #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254 #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38 #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138 #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4 #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs] #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs] #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs] #13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs] #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs] #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs] #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08 #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4 After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"), the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled. But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly causes the metadata bio to be throttled. Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait(). Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <alexjlzheng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <txpeng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <flyingpeng@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f6205f8 ] The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2]. Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE(). [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0: vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2: vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [2] #!/bin/bash set +H echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250204145549.1216254-2-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: __might_fault+0xa5/0x110 _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80 _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70 perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0 perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0 start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0 _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690 cpu_up+0x117/0x170 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170 smp_init+0x2b/0xf0 kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0 ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0 __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120 tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80 tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&buffer->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113: #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390 #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10 ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90 </TASK> The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527105820.0f45d045@gandalf.local.home Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Despite the fact that several lockdep-related checks are skipped when calling trylock* versions of the locking primitives, for example mutex_trylock, each time the mutex is acquired, a held_lock is still placed onto the lockdep stack by __lock_acquire() which is called regardless of whether the trylock* or regular locking API was used. This means that if the caller successfully acquires more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH locks of the same class, even when using mutex_trylock, lockdep will still complain that the maximum depth of the held lock stack has been reached and disable itself. For example, the following error currently occurs in the ARM version of KVM, once the code tries to lock all vCPUs of a VM configured with more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs, a situation that can easily happen on modern systems, where having more than 48 CPUs is common, and it's also common to run VMs that have vCPU counts approaching that number: [ 328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! [ 328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report [ 328.187531] depth: 48 max: 48! [ 328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664: [ 328.194957] #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0 [ 328.204048] #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.212521] #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.220991] #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.229463] #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.237934] #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.246405] #6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 Luckily, in all instances that require locking all vCPUs, the 'kvm->lock' is taken a priori, and that fact makes it possible to use the little known feature of lockdep, called a 'nest_lock', to avoid this warning and subsequent lockdep self-disablement. The action of 'nested lock' being provided to lockdep's lock_acquire(), causes the lockdep to detect that the top of the held lock stack contains a lock of the same class and then increment its reference counter instead of pushing a new held_lock item onto that stack. See __lock_acquire for more information. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Message-ID: <20250512180407.659015-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use kvm_trylock_all_vcpus instead of a custom implementation when locking all vCPUs of a VM, to avoid triggering a lockdep warning, in the case in which the VM is configured to have more than MAX_LOCK_DEPTH vCPUs. This fixes the following false lockdep warning: [ 328.171264] BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! [ 328.175227] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 328.180726] Please attach the output of /proc/lock_stat to the bug report [ 328.187531] depth: 48 max: 48! [ 328.190678] 48 locks held by qemu-kvm/11664: [ 328.194957] #0: ffff800086de5ba0 (&kvm->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_ioctl_create_device+0x174/0x5b0 [ 328.204048] #1: ffff0800e78800b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.212521] #2: ffff07ffeee51e98 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.220991] #3: ffff0800dc7d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.229463] #4: ffff07ffe0c980b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.237934] #5: ffff0800a3883c78 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 [ 328.246405] #6: ffff07fffbe480b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x16c/0x2a0 Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Message-ID: <20250512180407.659015-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit f6205f8 ] The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2]. Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE(). [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0: vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2: vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [2] #!/bin/bash set +H echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250204145549.1216254-2-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 88f7f56 ] When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush() generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC, which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait(). An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream: crash> bt 2091206 PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0" #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8 #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4 #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4 #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4 #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0 #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254 #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38 #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138 #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4 #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs] #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs] #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs] #13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs] #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs] #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs] #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08 #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4 After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"), the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled. But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly causes the metadata bio to be throttled. Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait(). Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <alexjlzheng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <txpeng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <flyingpeng@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f6205f8 ] The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2]. Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE(). [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0: vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2: vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [2] #!/bin/bash set +H echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250204145549.1216254-2-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 88f7f56 ] When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush() generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC, which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait(). An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream: crash> bt 2091206 PID: 2091206 TASK: ffff2050df92a300 CPU: 109 COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0" #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8 #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4 #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4 #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4 #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0 #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254 #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38 #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138 #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4 #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs] #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs] #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs] #13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs] #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs] #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs] #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08 #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4 After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"), the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled. But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly causes the metadata bio to be throttled. Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait(). Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <alexjlzheng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <txpeng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <flyingpeng@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f6205f8 ] The 'used' and 'updated' fields in the FDB entry structure can be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, leading to reports such as [1]. Can be reproduced using [2]. Suppress these reports by annotating these accesses using READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE(). [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vxlan_xmit / vxlan_xmit write to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 286 on cpu 0: vxlan_xmit+0xb29/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f read to 0xffff942604d263a8 of 8 bytes by task 287 on cpu 2: vxlan_xmit+0xadf/0x2380 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x84/0x2f0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x45a/0x1650 packet_xmit+0x100/0x150 packet_sendmsg+0x2114/0x2ac0 __sys_sendto+0x318/0x330 __x64_sys_sendto+0x76/0x90 x64_sys_call+0x14e8/0x1c00 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f value changed: 0x00000000fffbac6e -> 0x00000000fffbac6f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 287 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-01544-gb4b270f11a02 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 [2] #!/bin/bash set +H echo whitelist > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan echo !vxlan_xmit > /sys/kernel/debug/kcsan ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 dstport 4789 local 192.0.2.1 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 198.51.100.1 taskset -c 0 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & taskset -c 2 mausezahn vx0 -a own -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 0 -q & Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250204145549.1216254-2-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit c98cc97 upstream. Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: __might_fault+0xa5/0x110 _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80 _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70 perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0 perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0 start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0 _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690 cpu_up+0x117/0x170 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170 smp_init+0x2b/0xf0 kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0 ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0 __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120 tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80 tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&buffer->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113: #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390 #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10 ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90 </TASK> The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527105820.0f45d045@gandalf.local.home Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit c98cc97 upstream. Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: __might_fault+0xa5/0x110 _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80 _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70 perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0 perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0 start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0 _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690 cpu_up+0x117/0x170 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170 smp_init+0x2b/0xf0 kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0 ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0 __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120 tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80 tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&buffer->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113: #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390 #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10 ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90 </TASK> The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527105820.0f45d045@gandalf.local.home Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ] ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: https://github.com/NetBSD/src/commit/b69d1ac3f7702f67edfe412e4392f77d09804910 and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/792674400f6f04a074a3827349ed0e2ac10067f6 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 #10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f #11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf #12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 #13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 #14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d #15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e #16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad #17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e #18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 #19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 #20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 #21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 #22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 #23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 #24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 #25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc #26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 #27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 #28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 #29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d #30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 #31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 #32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 #33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d #34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 #35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e #36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 #37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 #38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 #39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 #40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 #41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When reconnecting a channel in smb2_reconnect_server(), a dummy tcon is passed down to smb2_reconnect() with ->query_interface uninitialized, so we can't call queue_delayed_work() on it. Fix the following warning by ensuring that we're queueing the delayed worker from correct tcon. WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1126 at kernel/workqueue.c:2498 __queue_delayed_work+0x1d2/0x200 Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1126 Comm: kworker/4:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014 Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_reconnect_server [cifs] RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x1d2/0x200 Code: 41 5e 41 5f e9 7f ee ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 5d ff ff ff bf 02 00 00 00 e8 6c f3 07 00 89 c3 eb bd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 57 f> 0b 90 e9 65 fe ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 72 fe ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 RSP: 0018:ffffc900014afad8 EFLAGS: 00010003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888124d99988 RCX: ffffffff81399cc1 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff888114326e00 RDI: ffff888124d999f0 RBP: 000000000000ea60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10249b3331 R10: ffff888124d9998f R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: ffff888114326e00 R14: ffff888124d999d8 R15: ffff888114939020 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88829f7fe000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffe7a2b4038 CR3: 0000000120a6f000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> queue_delayed_work_on+0xb4/0xc0 smb2_reconnect+0xb22/0xf50 [cifs] smb2_reconnect_server+0x413/0xd40 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb2_reconnect_server+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 ? lock_release+0x29b/0x390 process_one_work+0x4c5/0xa10 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0x120 worker_thread+0x2f1/0x5a0 ? __kthread_parkme+0xde/0x100 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1fe/0x380 ? kthread+0x10f/0x380 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x1f0 ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 ? lock_release+0x29b/0x390 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x1f0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 1116206 hardirqs last enabled at (1116205): [<ffffffff8143af42>] __up_console_sem+0x52/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (1116206): [<ffffffff81399f0e>] queue_delayed_work_on+0x6e/0xc0 softirqs last enabled at (1116138): [<ffffffffc04562fd>] __smb_send_rqst+0x42d/0x950 [cifs] softirqs last disabled at (1116136): [<ffffffff823d35e1>] release_sock+0x21/0xf0 Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Fixes: 42ca547 ("cifs: do not disable interface polling on failure") Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit 3bbe467 ] When reconnecting a channel in smb2_reconnect_server(), a dummy tcon is passed down to smb2_reconnect() with ->query_interface uninitialized, so we can't call queue_delayed_work() on it. Fix the following warning by ensuring that we're queueing the delayed worker from correct tcon. WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1126 at kernel/workqueue.c:2498 __queue_delayed_work+0x1d2/0x200 Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1126 Comm: kworker/4:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014 Workqueue: cifsiod smb2_reconnect_server [cifs] RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x1d2/0x200 Code: 41 5e 41 5f e9 7f ee ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 5d ff ff ff bf 02 00 00 00 e8 6c f3 07 00 89 c3 eb bd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 57 f> 0b 90 e9 65 fe ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 72 fe ff ff 90 0f 0b 90 e9 RSP: 0018:ffffc900014afad8 EFLAGS: 00010003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888124d99988 RCX: ffffffff81399cc1 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffff888114326e00 RDI: ffff888124d999f0 RBP: 000000000000ea60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10249b3331 R10: ffff888124d9998f R11: 0000000000000004 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: ffff888114326e00 R14: ffff888124d999d8 R15: ffff888114939020 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88829f7fe000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffe7a2b4038 CR3: 0000000120a6f000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> queue_delayed_work_on+0xb4/0xc0 smb2_reconnect+0xb22/0xf50 [cifs] smb2_reconnect_server+0x413/0xd40 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb2_reconnect_server+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 ? lock_release+0x29b/0x390 process_one_work+0x4c5/0xa10 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0x120 worker_thread+0x2f1/0x5a0 ? __kthread_parkme+0xde/0x100 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1fe/0x380 ? kthread+0x10f/0x380 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x1f0 ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 ? lock_release+0x29b/0x390 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x1f0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> irq event stamp: 1116206 hardirqs last enabled at (1116205): [<ffffffff8143af42>] __up_console_sem+0x52/0x60 hardirqs last disabled at (1116206): [<ffffffff81399f0e>] queue_delayed_work_on+0x6e/0xc0 softirqs last enabled at (1116138): [<ffffffffc04562fd>] __smb_send_rqst+0x42d/0x950 [cifs] softirqs last disabled at (1116136): [<ffffffff823d35e1>] release_sock+0x21/0xf0 Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Fixes: 42ca547 ("cifs: do not disable interface polling on failure") Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Return of the sync_check #5

Return of the sync_check #5

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donald commented Sep 13, 2023